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I. INTRODUCTION 
There have been four confirmation hearings in the United States Senate 
for nominees to the Supreme Court since 2004—first, for John Roberts to be 
the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2005, and then for Samuel Alito 
in 2006, Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Elena Kagan in 2010 to be Associate 
Justices. Each nominee faced hundreds of questions from a range of senators on 
a range of different constitutional issues. Among the thousands of questions 
asked in these four different Senate confirmation hearings, there were only a 
few issues that were raised in each of the four. One such issue was the role of 
comparative constitutional law in the American constitutional system. 
Senators performing for the television cameras are not the only ones with 
the feeling that something important and at least somewhat fresh and new is 
developing in our constitutional system. Just over ten years ago, Mark Tushnet 
wrote about the new possibilities of comparative constitutional law,1 and Bruce 
Ackerman wrote about the rise of world constitutionalism.2 Comparative 
constitutional law might offer different lessons to different scholars, but the 
sense shared by all is that something new and original is transpiring—that the 
Founding Moment for the domestic American Constitution might have 
transpired in 1787, but the Founding Moment for comparative constitutional 
law is right now. 
However universal this sense is that comparative constitutional law is 
new to the world of the American law school, it was actually universally 
studied in American law schools in the first few decades after World War II. 
Within a year of being appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953, 
Earl Warren traveled to Germany, Japan, and South Korea, speaking to 
audiences about a “revival of comparative jurisprudence”3 in the United 
States.4 Indeed, fifty years before the Senate Judiciary Committee asked Chief 
Justice Roberts about comparative constitutional law, Fortune Magazine ran an 
essay written by Chief Justice Warren about the importance of studying the 
constitutions of other countries. In statements that today might have prompted 
calls for his impeachment, Chief Justice Warren indicated that the principles in 
the American Constitution were not “discovered by our Founding Fathers. 
They had learned from the experience of people of all ages. But put together as 
they were and adapted to our conditions and mores, they have served us well.”5 
 
 1. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 
(1999). 
 2. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997). 
 3. Earl Warren, The Law and the Future, FORTUNE, Nov. 1955, at 106, 229. 
 4. At a dinner to honor his visit to South Korea, Chief Justice Warren spoke of the “common 
bond between men of law in all nations because . . . law . . . is not strictly our own.” Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, Remarks at Dinner Honoring Chief Justice Warren hosted by Korean Chief Justice Co Chin-
Man (Sept. 12, 1967) (transcript available at Library of Congress, Register of Earl Warren papers). 
There are certainly Justices who travel around the world now, but it is hard to imagine them making 
such bold claims about the role of comparative law in the United States as Chief Justice Warren did in 
his lecture. 
 5. Thomas Ginsburg, The Warren Court in East Asia: An Essay in Comparative Law, in 
EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 265, 266 n.4 
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007). 
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Justice William O. Douglas gave a series of lectures and published a book 
about the constitutional law of India.6 Justice Robert Jackson, after working on 
the Nuremberg Trials, traveled the country and the world discussing recent 
comparative constitutional changes.7 
The actions of these three Justices were not anomalous, but were instead a 
reflection of the burgeoning interest in comparative constitutional law in 
American law schools during that time period. Many law schools created 
comparative constitutional law classes during the first few decades after World 
War II, and a substantial percentage of the articles in the two leading law 
reviews (the Harvard Law Review and The Yale Law Journal) touched in some 
way on comparative constitutional law—almost as many articles as touched on 
American Supreme Court cases resolving issues of American constitutional 
law. Erwin Griswold—Dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty-one years, 
Solicitor General of the United States under President Nixon, and the lawyer 
who argued more cases before the United States Supreme Court than any other 
during the twentieth century—wrote several law review articles about the 
constitutional experiences of foreign countries.8 
But just as quickly as comparative constitutional law came to prominence 
in American law schools, starting in the early 1970s it began to disappear. Law 
schools that had earlier created comparative constitutional law classes scrapped 
those classes in the next few decades. The same two leading law reviews that 
had earlier published many articles on comparative constitutional law issues 
then went several decades before publishing another article touching on the 
topic. Just as soon as comparative constitutional law rose to prominence, it 
disappeared into thin air. 
The reasons for the rise—and later the fall—of comparative constitutional 
law are complicated, but many of these reasons revolve around the changing 
focus of the elite members of the legal profession. This dynamic explains why 
comparative constitutional law first rose to prominence in the decades after 
World War II, when American lawyers returned from their service overseas and 
the attention of the profession and the country was focused overseas; it also 
explains why when the attention of the profession turned inward during the 
years of the Warren Court, comparative constitutional law largely disappeared. 
This dynamic of a profession engaged in comparative developments was also 
cultivated by scholars of comparative constitutional law themselves. The 
 
 6. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA (1956). 
 7. Helen J. Knowles, “Judgment of the Law”: Justice Robert H. Jackson and the Foundations 
of the London Charter (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340627. 
 8. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The “Coloured Vote Case” in South Africa, 65 HARV. L. 
REV. 1361 (1952) [hereinafter Griswold, Coloured Vote]; Erwin N. Griswold, The Demise of the High 
Court of Parliament in South Africa, 66 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1953); Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce 
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees: A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1951); 
Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools and the Legal Profession, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305 (1955); Erwin N. 
Griswold, Legal Education: Extent To Which Know-How in Practice Should Be Taught in Law Schools, 
6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 324 (1954); Erwin N. Griswold, Observations on Legal Education in Australia, 5 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 139 (1952). 
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profession started to focus more on public law litigation in American federal 
courts during later years, and this activity occupied many of the resources and 
energy that had earlier gone to comparative constitutional examination. 
Examining this world of American law schools after the fall of comparative 
constitutional law can also point to some of the deficiencies in American 
constitutional scholarship and some of the reasons why an infrastructure and 
related social movements have organized and supported Warren Court-style 
domestic litigation—to the detriment of comparative constitutional law, and 
therefore to the detriment of American judicial review. A similar story and 
division of time periods could be told for comparative law more generally, but 
this Article begins this story by focusing in particular on comparative 
constitutional law, which I define as the study of the domestic constitutional 
law of other countries. 
Part II examines the rise and fall of comparative constitutional law by 
examining the scholarship produced and classes taught by faculty at several 
dozen law schools. The Article then turns in Part III to offer some initial 
explanations for this dramatic turn of events. After Part III explains why 
comparative constitutional law succeeded and then disappeared, Part IV turns 
to discuss the significant costs of the disappearance of comparative 
constitutional law in particular. For constitutional scholarship, the “birth of an 
academic obsession”9 focused almost exclusively on domestic constitutional 
litigation was disastrous. It is certainly true that this helped “constitutional law 
[become] the most prestigious field in the legal academy.”10 The most notable 
scholars that the legal academy has ever produced wrote about how the 
American Constitution should be interpreted and how judicial review should 
operate. But, by ignoring comparative constitutional law, these and other 
scholars neglected to consider that other countries had been experimenting with 
some of the very ideas they advocated in their academic writings. Deprived of 
the insights to be gained from these comparative experiences, our domestic 
constitutional scholarship simply ignored significant insights that could have 
been gained from devoting attention to comparative constitutional law. 
The damage that the fall of comparative constitutional law did to the 
vocation of constitutional scholarship is also matched by the damage that this 
disappearance did to comparative constitutional law and to judicial review. As 
Part IV also discusses, the focus of the legal profession on domestic 
constitutional litigation related to domestic constitutional arguments 
encouraged the creation of an institutional infrastructure and social movements 
related to this litigation, which in turn created the personnel, the resources, and 
the intellectual support for scholarship about these developments. From the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on the jurisprudential left to the 
Institute for Justice on the jurisprudential right, an entire “support structure”11 
 
 9. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
 10. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 87 (1995). 
 11. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
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was created to develop arguments about domestic constitutional law. This came 
at a cost, one that scholars have yet to consider: because there was an 
infrastructure related to traditional domestic constitutional litigation but no 
similar infrastructure for comparative constitutional law, comparative 
constitutional law had no chance for success in the long term.12 The result was 
bad for constitutional law and for judicial review, because the resources and 
intellectual support for judicial review were based solely on arguments that 
could be derived from the American constitutional experience, rather than 
including the many successful constitutional experiences of countries around 
the world. 
After discussing the origins of this lack of interest in comparative 
constitutional law and the problems caused by this disinterest, Part V turns to 
some proposed solutions. Comparative constitutional law has enjoyed 
something of a revival in the past ten years, but it has been a fragile one. For 
the field to continue to reemerge, it must do what it did during the years when 
law schools were full of constitutional ideas from around the world: it must 
continue to solicit the interest of the legal profession, and of a wide range of 
legal scholars, in all of the many things that comparative constitutional law has 
to offer. Part V considers some strategies to ensure that the legal profession and 
law schools return to their interest in comparative constitutional law, but in a 
more durable and permanent manner. 
II. THE POSTWAR RISE AND FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The creation moment for American law schools was surely during the 
nineteenth century, either during the earlier portion of the century with the 
creation of Litchfield Law School in Connecticut or during the latter part of the 
century with the tenure of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of Harvard 
Law School and the creation of the case method of teaching.13 If the creation 
 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21 (1998). 
 12. Very few of the discussions about the social movements related to the emergence of the 
Warren Court focus on how these movements spurned comparative and international law and thereby 
precluded the creation of comparative and international legal movements. There is much scholarship 
about the relationship between social movements and the creation of constitutional law, but it is almost 
entirely focused on the domestic angle. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women’s Movement, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1421 (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the 
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 
(2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]; Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
 13. The law school at Litchfield was really “[t]he first American school of law, organized 
strictly to prepare students to be lawyers, and distinct from a general bachelor’s degree course.” Steve 
Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture 
Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 564 (1997); see also id. at 565 (“The Litchfield [program] established the 
framework for instruction in the professional law school.”). Langdell’s most significant contribution was 
to create a system of legal education based on the idea that “knowledge of the law is best derived from 
its sources, the cases.” Id. at 597. This system of legal education quickly became the most popular 
system in the country. See id. at 608. 
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moment was during the nineteenth century, though, the consolidation moment 
for American law schools was during the twentieth century, especially the years 
after World War II. It was during this period that the number of law schools 
skyrocketed, in part due first to the GI Bill and then to the Baby Boom during 
that time. It was also during this period that the modern system of legal 
scholarship was created. 
Yet our knowledge of American legal education in the years after World 
War II is thin. The leading studies of American legal education focus on the 
Litchfield and Langdell creation moments of the nineteenth century, or the 
movement from the Harvard-inspired legal formalism of earlier generations to 
the Yale-inspired legal realism of the years before World War II.14 There are 
several articles that have referenced, in passing, some changes in the classes 
being offered in American law schools over the years, in part by examining 
what classes were being offered by law schools during these decades after 
World War II or what articles were published by their law reviews.15 But these 
articles have always examined a very small number of (not so randomly 
generated) course listings or law reviews from very few years from the very 
elite law schools.16 That gives us only a partial picture of life in the legal 
academy during only a few years at a few elite law schools. Part of what this 
Article contributes, then, is to begin a discussion based on a more complete set 
of information about the teaching and scholarship of American law schools 
since World War II. This Article still contains more discussion about the elite 
law schools, for reasons that Laura Kalman has highlighted: there is simply 
 
 14. Robert Stevens, author of the most comprehensive account of the history of American 
legal education, spends a small fraction of his book on more recent developments. ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL AND LEGAL EDUCATION FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 206-17 (1987). 
 15. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 339, 339-66 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Geologic Strata] (examining changes in classes 
offered by law schools); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the “Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 2075, 2099-2100 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Lawyers] (examining changes in articles published in 
law reviews); Michael J. Saks, Howard Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, 
Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship? A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One 
Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1163 (1996). 
 16. For instance, Robert Gordon’s study of changing courses being offered examined just a 
few years at six of the most highly ranked law schools. See Gordon, Geologic Strata, supra note 15, at 
349 n.18 (“The following generalizations about changes in course offerings are based on sampling of 
law school catalogues in four private (Harvard, Stanford, Vanderbilt, Yale) and two public (Michigan, 
Texas) university law schools at ten year intervals from 1890 to 1990. We . . . went through the samples 
looking for first appearances of new courses and for the appearance and disappearance of required 
courses. Had we had more time, we would have liked to sample a much wider range of schools, 
including more non-elite schools . . . .”). Gordon’s examination of changing publication trends also 
focused on a small set of data about the most elite law reviews. See Gordon, Lawyers, supra note 15, at 
2099 (“Ariela Gross searched at my request the contents of three major law reviews in 1910 and every 
tenth year thereafter, to sense historical trends; and of five major law reviews in the last five years, to 
sense current trends.”). John Langbein’s study of comparative law scholarship also focused on just a few 
elite law schools. See John Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 
AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 546 (1995) (“Of the twenty-five schools that were top-ranked in the 1993 national 
ranking of university law schools, I have obtained catalog listings for the curriculum at all but one.”). 
The closest to a comprehensive study of changes in legal education we have is one study about changes 
in the content of law review articles published. See Saks et al., supra note 15. But the authors of that 
study, even though they examine ten law reviews, have other limitations in their data. For instance, in 
ensuring that they cover a range of schools, they rank schools “according to the size of their library 
holdings.” Id. at 1171. They also examined only two years, 1960 and 1985. Id. at 1171-72. 
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more available information about these schools, and these schools tended to 
have an outsized influence on legal education.17 
There are many trends to be gleaned from this information, but this Part 
focuses on one of them in greater detail: from 1945 until roughly 1972, 
comparative constitutional law became an accepted part of legal education in a 
much greater way than in the years before 1945. After 1972, as Part III will 
discuss in greater detail, the rise of the Warren Court (the political and legal 
prominence of that Court, the law clerks who clerked for that Court and then 
became professors, and a legal academy writing for and about that Court) led to 
the disappearance of comparative constitutional law. During earlier periods, the 
increasing interest in constitutional developments around the rest of the world 
took some time to become fully realized. As law professors returned from 
service in World War II and as constitutions were drafted overseas in greater 
numbers, gradually that interest affected law schools. 
The same thing happened with the gradual disappearance of comparative 
constitutional law. It took time for the Warren Court to have this effect on the 
pedagogy and scholarship of law schools. The former Warren Court clerks had 
to finish their clerkships and begin their teaching and writing careers. The legal 
profession needed time to realize the importance of the Warren Court and 
arrange funding for activities related to the Court. The “second Warren 
Court”18 presided from 1962 until 1969, and even before that, there were other 
major developments in constitutional law scholarship (many in response to 
Brown v. Board of Education19), like Herbert Wechsler’s article on neutral 
principles,20 Learned Hand’s Holmes Lectures,21 and Alexander Bickel’s The 
Least Dangerous Branch.22 These types of scholarly developments were 
important on their own, but during the Rise Era (the period from 1945 until 
1972) they were more exceptional than during the Fall Era (the period from 
1972 until 1999). The elite law professors at the elite law schools in the elite 
law reviews sometimes wrote on issues related to the Warren Court during the 
Rise Era—even if not as much as during later periods—but an examination of 
other law reviews suggests that the attention paid to these issues was 
widespread only later. It was not until roughly 1972 that the Fall Era began, and 
domestic constitutional law supplanted—and almost entirely eliminated—
comparative constitutional law. The global dimension of legal education that 
 
 17. See Laura Kalman, Professing Law: Elite Law School Professors in the Twentieth Century, 
in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 337, 340 (Austin Sarat, Bryant G. Garth & Robert A. Kagan 
eds., 2002). Note also that Barry Friedman’s article about postwar constitutional scholarship, the only 
other significant discussion of law schools and constitutional scholarship after World War II, is 
essentially exclusively about debates at the elite law schools by elite law professors. See Friedman, 
supra note 9. 
 18. Many have called the period from the appointment of Arthur Goldberg to the Court in 
1962 until the retirement of Earl Warren in 1969 the “second Warren Court.” See, e.g., Friedman, supra 
note 9, at 201. 
 19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1959). 
 21. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
 22. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
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had an almost natural and assumed part in American legal education in the 
years after World War II quickly dissolved in favor of new areas of particular 
constitutional interest. 
A. The Postwar Rise of Comparative Constitutional Law 
In the years after 1945, American law schools started to expand their 
focus on comparative constitutional law. Legal scholarship featured discussions 
of comparative constitutional issues in its most prominent publication locations 
(including the emerging series of Harvard Law Review Forewords published 
every year) and in articles by the most prominent figures in American 
constitutional scholarship at the time. Moreover, consistent with a field both 
new and becoming increasingly accepted, the nation’s leading law reviews 
contained methodological debates about what this new field should look like. 
This period of time—from 1945 until 1972—will be called the “Rise Era” in 
comparative constitutional law. 
In the first issue it ran after the end of World War II, The Yale Law 
Journal decided to focus on a topic that was in the news at the time: what the 
end of World War II meant for constitutional democracies in the new 
international legal system. Justice William O. Douglas, himself a scholar of 
some stature,23 wrote the lead article for the symposium about the potential 
domestic constitutional structures of countries in the new international 
community.24 Yale Law Professor Grant Gilmore, known as perhaps the most 
influential contracts scholar of his generation,25 wrote an article for the 
symposium about the International Court of Justice and comparative 
constitutional law.26 Gilmore later wrote several other articles about 
comparative constitutional law.27 
In the years to come The Yale Law Journal would publish many more 
articles with comparative constitutional law dimensions.28 The Harvard Law 
 
 23. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and 
Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2000) (labeling Douglas a 
“prominent scholar”). 
 24. William O. Douglas, Foreword, 55 YALE L.J. 865, 868-69 (1946). 
 25. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, What Grant Gilmore Taught Us, 92 YALE L.J. 6, 6 (1982) 
(“Grant’s reputation was enormous . . . .”); Nathan Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 
GEO. L.J. 77, 82 (2009) (discussing the “influential” scholarship of Gilmore). 
 26. Grant Gilmore, The International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J. 1049 (1946). 
 27. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Circular Priority Systems: South African Apartheid Legislation, 
71 YALE L.J. 53 (1961). 
 28. Of the 517 articles published between 1945 and 1972 in The Yale Law Journal, fifty 
touched upon comparative constitutional issues. For some notable examples, see Charles E. Clark & 
William D. Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization, 61 YALE 
L.J. 1147 (1952); Jan Deutsch, Some Problems of Church and State in the Weimar Constitution, 72 
YALE L.J. 457 (1963); Walter Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1 (1965); John 
N. Hazard, Mali’s Socialism and the Soviet Legal Model, 77 YALE L.J. 28 (1967); Hans Kelsen, Law, 
State and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, 57 YALE L.J. 377 (1948); Karl Loewenstein, The Bonn 
Constitution and the European Defense Community Treaties, 64 YALE L.J. 805 (1955); Karl 
Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative Process in Occupied Germany: I, 57 YALE L.J. 724 (1948); Karl 
Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative Process in Occupied Germany: II, 57 YALE L.J. 994 (1948); Inga 
S. Markovits, Civil Law in East Germany—Its Development and Relation to Soviet Legal History and 
Ideology, 78 YALE L.J. 1 (1968); and Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Free Speech in the Indian Constitution: 
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Review, the other leading law review at the time and since, published a similar 
number of articles raising comparative constitutional topics.29 When it was time 
to run a series of tributes to Justice Felix Frankfurter, The Yale Law Journal 
invited a noted judge from another country to write one of the tribute essays,30 
and the Harvard Law Review did the same in their tribute to Justice 
Frankfurter.31 When major constitutional developments arose overseas, such as 
the creation of the innovative French Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 
1958, law reviews usually ran an article discussing them.32 Other law reviews 
of similar stature had a similar percentage and prominence of comparative 
constitutional law articles.33 Even outside of the elite law reviews, there were 
many articles discussing comparative constitutional themes—albeit slightly 
fewer articles than in the top law reviews—and certainly more than during the 
Fall Era of comparative constitutional law.34 
These articles discussing comparative constitutional themes were featured 
 
Background and Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 384 (1958). 
 29. Of the 694 articles published in the Harvard Law Review between 1945 and 1972, sixty-
seven touched upon issues of comparative constitutional law. In addition to the Erwin Griswold articles 
cited in note 8, supra, for other notable examples see John Clarke Adams & Mauro Cappelleti, 
Comment, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1207 (1966); Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 
82 HARV. L. REV. 1245 (1969); Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and Judicial 
Independence: 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1969); Morris R. Cohen, Italian Contributions to the 
Philosophy of Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 577 (1946); Carl J. Friedrich, The New French Constitution in 
Political and Historical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1959); Walter Gellhorn, Settling 
Disagreements with Officials in Japan, 79 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1966); W. Barton Leach, Comment, 
Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797 
(1967); Karl Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American-Occupied 
Germany, 61 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1948); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Restraint and the West German 
Constitutional Court, 75 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1961); and Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law and History As 
Bases for Chinese Law, 61 HARV. L. REV. 749 (1948). 
 30. Owen Dixon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: A Tribute from Australia, 67 YALE L.J. 179 (1957). 
 31. Lord Evershed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 76 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1962). 
 32. See, e.g., Friedrich, supra note 29. 
 33. For some prominent examples, see, for example, José A. Cabranes, Human Rights and 
Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147 (1967); Mauro Cappelletti, 
Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1017 (1970); Cornelius P. Cotter, 
Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience, 5 STAN. L. REV. 382 (1953); Cornelius 
P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Experience 6 STAN. L. REV. 238 (1954); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical 
Jurisprudence, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 201 (1961); Herman Finer, The British System, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 
521 (1951); Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal 
Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949); John N. Hazard, The Soviet Union and a World Bill of Rights, 
47 COLUM. L. REV. 1095 (1947); Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United 
States: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1960); Hans Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47 CAL. 
L. REV. 107 (1959); Viscount Kilmuir, Justice Jackson and Nuremberg—A British Tribute, 8 STAN. L. 
REV. 54 (1955); Karl Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe: Illusion and Reality—An Appraisal 
of the Methods: Part I, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1952); Karl Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe: 
Illusion and Reality—An Appraisal of the Methods: Part II, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1952); 
Symposium, Man’s Right to Knowledge, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 710 (1954); M. Ramaswamy, 
Constitutional Developments in India 1600-1955, 8 STAN. L. REV. 326 (1955); and Pradyumna K. 
Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (1947). 
 34. For some prominent examples in these journals, see Bernard Green, Federalism and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice: The Treatment of Obscenity in the United States, Canada and 
Australia, 51 KY. L.J. 667 (1963); Frank R. Lacy, Yugoslavia: Practice and Procedure in a Communist 
Country, 43 OR. L. REV. 1 (1963); and Yasuo Tokikuni, Obscenity and the Japanese Constitution, 51 
KY. L.J. 703 (1963). 
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in some of the most prominent locations for academic debate in American legal 
scholarship. Consider, first of all, the content of the annual Forewords to the 
Harvard Law Review, first published during the Rise Era.35 These Forewords 
“are widely taken to be good indications of the state of the field [of 
constitutional law],”36 and have “a considerable prestige and influence.”37 
During this period, many of these Forewords touched on comparative 
constitutional themes.38 
In another sign of the role of comparative constitutional law during the 
Rise Era—a topic that will be discussed in greater detail in Part III—major 
scholars of constitutional law of all sorts were writing articles discussing 
comparative constitutional law. Lectures and essays by Chief Justice Warren 
were published for a general audience in places like Fortune Magazine, and 
Chief Justice Warren also spoke about comparative constitutional law in a 
speech reproduced in the Kentucky Law Journal.39 Noted Senator William 
Fulbright wrote in the same journal about the importance of promoting 
constitutionalism around the world for American foreign policy.40 As 
mentioned earlier, Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School wrote several 
articles with comparative constitutional themes.41 Kenneth Karst, who wrote 
one of the leading articles justifying many of the Warren Court’s privacy 
decisions,42 wrote about Latin American constitutional law.43 Moreover, when 
a field of scholarship begins to increase in size and prominence, it goes through 
moments of significant self-definition. This type of methodological debate and 
angst about comparative constitutional law appeared even in the mainstream, 
general interest law reviews of the day, like the Columbia Law Review44 and 
the Harvard Law Review.45 
 
 35. Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and 
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463 (1994) (“Since 1951 the editors of the Harvard 
Law Review have selected a prominent scholar of constitutional law to write a ‘Foreword’ to the 
Review’s annual survey of the work of the Supreme Court.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 464. 
 38. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term—Foreword: Of Time and 
Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1960) (discussing the social 
situation of British judges); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term—Foreword: 
Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1953) (discussing a British House 
of Lords decision); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Foreword: “Equal in Origin 
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 
143, 163 (1964) (discussing British federalism); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1956 
Term—Foreword: The Citizen’s Immunities and Public Opinion, 71 HARV. L. REV. 85, 86 (1957) 
(discussing British rules about Communist sympathizers). 
 39. Earl Warren, Address at the World Conference on World Peace Through the Rule of Law, 
Athens, Greece (July 1, 1965), 53 KY. L.J. 5 (1965). 
 40. William J. Fulbright, Foreign Policy—Old Myths and New Realities, 53 KY. L.J. 13 
(1965). 
 41. See supra note 8. 
 42. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
 43. Kenneth L. Karst, Teaching Latin American Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 685, 685 (1971). 
Karst was a member of the Board of Editors for The American Journal of Comparative Law. 
 44. Kenneth S. Carlston, The Teaching of International Law in Law Schools, 48 COLUM. L. 
REV. 516 (1948); Ernst Rabel, On Institutes for Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 227 (1947); John 
R. Stevenson, Comparative and Foreign Law in American Law Schools, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 613 (1950). 
 45. Angelo Piero Sereni, On Teaching Comparative Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 770 (1951). 
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Given the interest in comparative constitutional themes by American law 
professors in their writing, it should come as no surprise that many law schools 
featured new classes touching on these themes. In the early part of the 1950s, a 
series of new teaching materials related to comparative law more generally and 
comparative constitutional law in particular appeared for the first time.46 The 
first law school to offer a comparative constitutional law class was the 
University of Alabama Law School, which offered a course billed as “a 
comparison of the American constitutional system with those of other nations, 
including a review of the political institutions on the background of the 
constitutional practice of various countries.”47 Other schools created similar 
classes with a range of titles, from “Comparative Jurisprudence” at the 
University of California to “Comparative-Historical Method” at Harvard Law 
School.48 But the content of the classes was substantially similar: an 
examination of the constitutional structures of the rest of the world. 
In accord with this increased interest in infusing course offerings with 
classes on comparative law in general and comparative constitutional law in 
particular, American law schools also started to invite students and faculty from 
overseas to teach and collaborate with their American colleagues. At Yale Law 
School, for instance, several of the leading figures of the Israeli legal system 
enrolled as graduate law students around this time.49 The law school also 
invited foreign faculty to become a part of the life of the law school: Otto 
Kahn-Freund of the London School of Economics became a regular visitor.50 
Notable foreign faculty also visited other American law schools for the first 
time: Julius Stone from Australia visited at Colorado, as did René David from 
France,51 and Konrad Zweigert from Germany visited at Michigan.52 Harvard 
Law School created a “Joseph Story Fellows” program to recruit young foreign 
academics to teach and write at the law school,53 and also regularly invited 
Japanese law faculty to teach and visit.54 The same was true of other law 
schools of all kinds, from Indiana to Tulane to Berkeley to Idaho.55 
These new foreign visitors to law schools may have been mere visitors, 
but this was also the period when a substantial number of academic refugees 
from foreign countries played a substantial role in a number of American law 
 
 46. See Max Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law: A Book Survey, 1 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 95, 95 (1952) (“Several books entitled comparative law or the like have appeared on the scene in 
recent years.”). 
 47. Stevenson, supra note 44, at 623. 
 48. Id. at 618. 
 49. Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties 
Come To Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 653, 660 (2009). 
 50. Joseph Dainow, Exchange Opportunities for American and Foreign Law Teachers, 9 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 57, 57 (1956). 
 51. Id. at 60. 
 52. Alfred F. Conard & Eric Stein, Foreign Law in Foreign Language, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
232, 232 (1957). 
 53. Daniel R. Coquilette, In Memoriam: Arthur T. von Mehren, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1950 
(2006). 
 54. Dainow, supra note 50, at 62. 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 62-63. 
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schools. Scholars like Max Rheinstein at the University of Chicago Law School 
and Rudolf Schlesinger enjoyed considerable success writing about 
comparative law, including sometimes about comparative constitutional law.56 
One refugee, Felix Frankfurter, held a position on the Supreme Court, and 
sometimes cited comparative constitutional law.57 Indeed, in many ways it was 
the success of these refugees—and their failure to designate (domestic) 
successors, as John Langbein has noted58—that was part of the reason that 
comparative law in general (perhaps including comparative constitutional law) 
came to be seen as a “refugee field.”59 
American law professors were also involved in advising other countries 
on the creation of their constitutional systems. Stanford Law School hosted a 
major conference related to the creation of the Indian Constitution and the 
Indian legal system.60 Former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound 
advised pre-Communist China.61 Arthur Von Mehren served as a visiting 
professor at the Indian Law Institute.62 Stanford Law School Dean Carl B. 
Spaeth worked with leaders of the Indian bar on a range of public law issues in 
India.63 And as a sign of how accepted comparative constitutional scholarship 
and pedagogy was, consider how uncontroversial all of these activities were, 
despite the fact that they took place during the McCarthy Era, when other 
American academics were fired for their writings about and interest in other 
countries.64 
Of course, the prominence of comparative constitutional law in 
scholarship and pedagogy should not be overstated. Comparative constitutional 
law was far from the most substantial topic of discussion in American 
constitutional scholarship during the Rise Era. Most of the major pieces of 
constitutional law scholarship at the time were focused entirely on domestic 
constitutional law issues.65 The most notable feature of the Rise Era was the 
 
 56. Langbein, supra note 16, at 547. 
 57. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign 
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 743, 840-45 (2005) (discussing all of the opinions written by Justice Frankfurter that 
reference comparative constitutional law). 
 58. Langbein, supra note 16, at 547-48. 
 59. Id. at 547. 
 60. Lawrence R. Ebb, Preface to PUBLIC LAW PROBLEMS IN INDIA: A SURVEY REPORT, at v, v 
(Lawrence R. Ebb ed., 1957). 
 61. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 
515-16 (1964). Pound later wrote an article about his experiences. Pound, supra note 29; see also 
Mitchel Lasser, Comparative Readings of Roscoe Pound’s Jurisprudence, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 719, 728 
(2002) (“The depth and breadth of Pound’s multinational and trans-historical field of substantive and 
theoretical references suggest that Pound might possess a remarkably panoramic vista for large-scale 
comparative analysis.”). 
 62. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Law and Legal Education in India: Some Observations, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 1180 (1965). 
 63. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford 
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 454 n.43 
(2004). 
 64. See PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THIELENS, JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND 70 (1958). 
 65. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1952); Arthur E. Sutherland, The Supreme Court and the General Will, 82 PROC. AM. ACAD. 
ARTS & SCI. 169 (1953). 
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high level of interest in comparative constitutional law scholarship and teaching 
during this period—and how much that contrasted with what was to follow. 
B. The Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law 
As rapidly as comparative constitutional law ascended in American law 
schools, it disappeared just as quickly from 1972 until 1999—what this Article 
calls the “Fall Era,” a twenty-seven year period similar in length but radically 
different in focus from the Rise Era. As Part III discusses in greater detail, in 
place of comparative constitutional law came attention to the Supreme Court 
and the changes in domestic constitutional law resulting from the Court’s 
decisions. Consider, for instance, the pages of the nation’s law reviews. The 
Harvard Law Review went a few decades after 1972 before publishing another 
article on comparative constitutional issues. Only two Harvard Law Review 
Forewords during the Fall Era discuss comparative constitutional law.66 
Outside of the highest ranked law reviews, the change was similar and even 
more dramatic. 
While during the Rise Era comparative constitutional law was a topic of 
scholarly interest to all sorts of scholars, during the Fall Era hardly any major, 
notable legal scholar outside of the specialized field of comparative 
constitutional law took any interest in the subject.67 The attention of American 
legal scholars turned instead to the Warren Court and the developments in 
constitutional law generated by Warren Court decisions. Every single year 
during the Fall Era, the Harvard Law Review and The Yale Law Journal 
published at least one article about a Supreme Court case and one article about 
the career or recent death of a scholar who wrote about the Supreme Court. 
This scholarship about the Warren Court was so substantial that there began to 
be substantial scholarship about Warren Court scholarship. D.C. Circuit Judge 
J. Skelly Wright took to the pages of the Harvard Law Review to write about 
“Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.”68 Anthony 
Lewis, the Supreme Court reporter for The New York Times, covered Bickel’s 
Holmes Lectures.69 
Just as it was earlier important to qualify the limitations of the increase in 
attention to comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era, so too it is 
 
 66. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the 
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1980) (discussing free speech in Britain); Paul A. Freund, The 
Supreme Court, 1973 Term—Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34 (1974) 
(discussing a British case related to executive privilege). 
 67. David Currie is an exception. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986). Currie’s contribution to our understanding of the German Basic Law was 
memorialized in a symposium issue dedicated to his work. See, e.g., Peter E. Quint, David Currie and 
German Constitutional Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 2081 (2008). Gerhard Casper, later Dean of the University 
of Chicago School of Law and President of Stanford University, was another comparative constitutional 
law scholar writing at the time who was integrated into other constitutional and legal debates. See, e.g., 
Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177 (1985). 
 68. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). 
 69. Anthony Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REV. 305 (1961). 
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important to note that even during the Fall Era there was still some lingering 
interest in comparative constitutional law—just not much. The Fall Era was the 
period when interest in international law grew substantially, as Part III 
discusses in greater detail, and part of that discussion inevitably involved some 
discussion of comparative constitutional law. More importantly and more 
directly related, this was roughly the same period as the creation of the law and 
development movement,70 which represented essentially the exclusive source 
of interest in comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era. 
But, for several reasons, the rise of the law and development movement 
was not enough to stem the disappearance of comparative constitutional law 
scholarship during the Fall Era. The law and development movement was a 
much more isolated and much less popular movement than, among other 
movements, the comparative constitutional law movement during the Rise Era. 
A few law schools—primarily Yale and Wisconsin—focused their energies on 
law and development, but most law schools had neither a single scholar nor a 
single class focused on the topic. Perhaps a decade or less after its creation, 
whatever there was of the law and development movement faded and almost 
disappeared, although there are some signs of a small recent revival.71 
At the same time that comparative constitutional law was disappearing 
from the scholarship of law professors, it was also disappearing from the 
classes being offered by these professors. Law schools instead began to offer 
classes in fields related to the decisions of the Warren Court.72 Searching 
through the course offering directories shows almost no listings of comparative 
constitutional classes, but lots of listings of new constitutional law classes. 
In terms of the role of comparative constitutional law during the years 
after World War II, then, there were two clear periods. The first period featured 
broad and robust interest in comparative constitutional law. Journals of all sorts 
published articles on the topic. Faculty of all kinds wrote on the topic. Students 
of all backgrounds enrolled in classes on the topic. During the second period, 
almost the complete opposite was true. Very few articles were published. Very 
few faculty wrote about the topic. Classes on the topic were scaled back and in 
some places eliminated. Such a dramatic change in such a relatively short 
period of time leads to the obvious question: what happened? 
III. EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
The rise and fall of comparative constitutional law took all of a 
 
 70. See Brian Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
470, 470 (1995) (book review) (“Law and development has been a field of academic study for about 
thirty years.”). 
 71. See, e.g., DAVID M. TRUBEK, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, 
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74, 81 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 72. See Gordon, Geologic Strata, supra note 15, at 361 (“The constitutional law of free speech 
and religion, of criminal procedure, and of federal jurisdiction have become topics so large as to have 
been broken off and made into separate courses.”). 
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generation. Such a dramatic story is more than mere accident. This Part 
explores this narrative of comparative constitutional law and the reasons for its 
initial success and eventual disappearance. In doing so, it highlights some of 
the dynamics that lead to the rise and fall of jurisprudential movements more 
generally, dynamics that I will discuss in greater detail in future writings. As 
this Part discusses, a crucial variable—perhaps not the only variable, but an 
indispensible one—in explaining the rise and fall of comparative constitutional 
law was its relationship with elite sectors of the legal profession. A strong 
relationship with the profession might not be a sufficient basis for a 
movement’s success, but it is a helpful one. This relationship between the legal 
profession and a scholarly movement has been noted in passing before,73 but 
this Part will explain this strong relationship in the context of comparative 
constitutional law in greater detail. 
This relationship in the context of comparative constitutional law was 
created because of the structure of the production of legal scholarship, on both 
the “supply side” and the “demand side.” By the “supply side,” I refer to those 
who actually produce the classes and scholarship—law professors. By the 
“demand side,” I mean those who consume the classes and scholarship of law 
professors—law students and lawyers. 
On the “supply side,” during the Rise Era, the most accomplished 
personnel of the legal academy were coming from a legal profession that was 
itself more interested in the rest of the world, and thus had practiced in areas 
more tied to the rest of the world. The profession affects the pedagogical and 
scholarly agenda of the law professor because it provides the developments 
(and in the case of the elite profession, the most important developments) that 
serve as the potential topics about which law professors write and teach. During 
the Rise Era many of the more interesting developments were transpiring 
outside of the United States. The comparative orientation of the profession, 
then, was “jurisgenerative”74 in the sense of generating law and debates about 
law. 
On the “demand side,” too, the profession mattered enormously in 
creating interest in comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era and 
discouraging interest during the Fall Era. Part of the reason for the decline of 
classes about comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era, for instance, 
was because of the decline in student interest in comparative constitutional 
topics; similarly, part of the increase in classes during the Rise Era was due to 
student interest in comparative constitutional law. Law students are the 
consumers of the pedagogy of law schools. These changes in student 
preferences also affected the production of scholarship. Law students, after all, 
are the ones who decide which articles to publish, and changes in their interests 
 
 73. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 
1539 (1991) (“[T]he academy has had difficulty understanding how people could be interested in the 
law without being interested in influencing policymakers . . . . The concern of law schools with those 
presently holding power, or likely to do so in the near future, makes the more radical program associated 
with critical legal studies seem disconnected from the mission of the law school.”). 
 74. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 33 (1983). 
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and priorities affected which articles were accepted (at all and by the most 
prestigious journals) during the Rise and Fall Eras. 
The elite parts of the legal profession were also partly responsible for the 
change in interest in comparative constitutional law because of a shift in the 
allocation of resources. Resources from elite parts of the profession shifted 
from legal issues outside of the United States to domestic federal public law 
litigation. The legal arms of groups like the Ford Foundation shifted their focus 
from creating or recreating domestic legal systems in the rest of the world to 
funding federal litigation and law school clinics in the United States. 
This shift in focus in law schools was also affected by the behavior of law 
professors. During the Rise Era, professors writing about comparative 
constitutional law were producing “integrated” scholarship—scholarship that 
speaks to what a broader community of scholars and American legal 
professionals might find interesting.75 Scholarship will speak more to the 
profession if it is normative rather than descriptive—telling lawyers and judges 
what they can and should do—which is why so much of legal scholarship is in 
fact normative. The revival of constitutional history, for instance, was assisted 
by the ability of constitutional historians to speak about what courts should 
decide in actual cases in American courts.76 For comparative constitutional law 
today, integrated scholarship may be biased in favor of discussing what 
comparative constitutional law means for American institutions. 
The production of integrated scholarship during the Rise Era also led to a 
wider range of law schools and law professors finding comparative 
constitutional law scholarship useful. The elite and wealthy law schools tend to 
have faculty who are more interested in intellectual luxury goods—scholarship 
with a less obvious relationship to the profession.77 But if this elite, luxury 
scholarship is integrated into other fields of scholarship and made of interest to 
the profession, then students and faculty at other schools will find it of interest. 
It will thus attract the interest of a broader range of law professors, increasing 
the status of the field in law schools, exposing more students to the field, and 
 
 75. I used this concept in an earlier article where I was asked to respond to an article by Mark 
Tushnet about comparative constitutional law. See David Fontana, The Next Generation of 
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 445, 448 (2004) (“We need to move beyond ‘all or nothing’ scholarship on this topic and find a 
way to create a principled system of integrative activities. Consequently, the best way forward is to 
begin considering how to create a world where the domestic and foreign are integrated, but integrated in 
the optimal manner.”). Imperialism might be good for the power of all intellectual fields. See Jack 
Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 53 (1985) (discussing how the 
imperialism of economics has helped that field). But what is different about legal scholarship is that its 
imperialism must extend not just to other fields of scholarship, but to the practice of law itself. 
 76. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 (2006) (“Drawing on the work of pioneer conservative 
academics like Robert Bork and Raoul Berger, originalism became a central organizing principle for the 
Reagan Justice Department’s assault on what it regarded as a liberal federal judiciary.”). 
 77. See J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 951 
(1996) (“It is important to recognize that the picture is somewhat different at non-elite law schools. 
Interdisciplinary scholarship has gained less of a foothold there; it is not hegemonic in the way it has 
become at some of the fancy schools.”). It is hard to argue that this scholarship is really “hegemonic” at 
these schools since most of the scholarship being produced by faculty there is not substantially 
interdisciplinary—even though most new faculty might be doing this kind of work. 
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thereby making the profession more interested as well. 
Casting the net widely by producing integrated scholarship can also 
attract scholars of high intellectual status, which can help the field.78 If 
renowned scholars are writing about issues related to a particular 
jurisprudential movement, then the movement is more likely to attract other 
scholars to write about the area and to attract students to take classes in the 
area. The movement is also more likely to gain the attention of the profession, 
which is more likely to have heard of the professor—and therefore the area—
because of the high status of the professor. Simply put, during the Rise Era 
there was much more integrated scholarship about comparative constitutional 
law of interest to both academics and legal professionals; during the Fall Era 
there was much less. 
The prominence of comparative constitutional law was also influenced by 
developments in cognate disciplines. Cognate disciplines produce data and 
information that legal scholars can then integrate into a more transferable series 
of programmatic and practical normative lessons for other scholars and for the 
profession. For instance, the revival of constitutional history was sparked in 
part by the resurgence of interest in legal history among history departments. It 
might be hard to remember now, but Daniel J. Boorstin had it right in 1958 
when he called the field of legal history a “Dark Continent.”79 But since then, 
“the turn to history”80 has been assisted by the resurgence of legal history in 
history departments.81 During the Rise Era, scholars writing about 
constitutional law, comparative law, and in political science departments were 
all interested in comparative constitutional law. During the Fall Era, almost 
none of these fields cared about comparative constitutional law. 
This relationship between the professors and the profession is not meant 
to exclude the role that larger political and social developments played in the 
change from the foreign to the domestic. During the Rise Era, the country in 
general was focused more on the rest of the world; during the Fall Era, our 
attention turned inward, and that is part of the reason why our law schools did 
as well. 
A. The Rise Era 
1. The Legal Profession and the Rise Era 
The American legal profession was fascinated by the rest of the world 
during the Rise Era, and once World War II ended, it turned its attention to 
legal developments abroad. When it came to comparative constitutional law in 
 
 78. See Neil Gross, Becoming a Pragmatist Philosopher: Status, Self-Concept, and 
Intellectual Choice, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 52 (2002). 
 79. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 399 (1958). 
 80. Kalman, supra note 17, at ch. 5 (discussing the “turn to history” among law professors). 
 81. See Stephen Botein, Professional History Reconsidered, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 60, 60-66 
(1977) (reviewing MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 
(1976), and JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA (1977)) (discussing how the state of American legal history has “improved markedly” since 
Boorstin’s comments). 
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particular, the years after World War II were the most active years the world 
had ever seen. Samuel Huntington has written about “waves of democracy,”82 
but there have also been similar waves of constitutionalism—with the most 
substantial one transpiring in the years after World War II. In the first few 
decades after World War II constitutional law spread around the world, from 
the former Axis powers (Japan in 1947, Italy in 1948, and Germany in 1949), 
to the formerly defiantly anti-constitutionalist France (in 1958), and so on. 
These developments outside of the United States captured the attention 
and commanded the energies of the legal profession inside of the United States. 
The profession was intimately involved in what Chief Justice Earl Warren in 
1955 called a “revival of comparative jurisprudence.”83 As mentioned before, 
Chief Justice Warren traveled the world to give speeches about comparative 
constitutional law. He wrote an essay for Fortune Magazine about this burst of 
constitutional activity around the world, and noted that “American lawyers are 
already taking an active part.”84 Warren wrote essays for a range of law reviews 
about the spread of constitutionalism around the world, including for a new 
academic publication focused exclusively on comparative law, the American 
Journal of Comparative Law.85 
He was not alone: Justice Felix Frankfurter, himself born in Austria86 and 
a frequent consumer of comparative constitutional law in his opinions,87 wrote 
a notable scholarly Foreword—not for the Harvard Law Review, but for the 
American Journal of Comparative Law—discussing the historical linkages 
between the American Supreme Court and the constitutional discussions of 
other countries.88 Justice Douglas wrote a book on the constitutional law of 
India.89 Justice Jackson delivered lectures and wrote about comparative 
constitutional law.90 The Supreme Court cited comparative constitutional law 
with great frequency.91 And it was not just the Supreme Court that was 
interested in legal developments in the rest of the world. American judges 
hosted visits from foreign constitutional dignitaries in the United States, such as 
when Justice Frankfurter and Learned Hand met with visitors from India to 
discuss the new Constitution of India.92 
Because the profession was interested in the rest of the world, a greater 
comparative orientation in law schools naturally followed. Large numbers of 
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law professors, before and even during their time teaching, had experience 
interacting with the rest of the world. Regardless of whether the average 
member of the legal profession had spent time abroad, many of the elite 
members of the profession who then became law professors had international 
experience. Noted constitutional scholar Paul Carrington of Duke Law School, 
who joined the Duke faculty in 1957, served in the U.S. Army during the 
Korean War.93 Eugene Rostow, professor at Yale Law School starting in 1937, 
and Dean from 1955 until 1965, worked on the Lend-Lease Program in the 
State Department and later worked as a policy advisor to Assistant Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson.94 Kingman Brewster, hired to teach at Harvard Law 
School in 1950 and later the President of Yale University, worked for a year for 
the General Counsel of the Office of Special Representative in Europe.95 
Between 1954 and 1955, when Harvard hired three tenure-track faculty 
members, only one had clerked, while another had served as an ambassador in 
Europe from 1950 to 1951.96 In 1964, the one new law professor Stanford hired 
had served as a special assistant to an undersecretary of state.97 With 
experiences overseas before becoming law professors, it was natural that the 
research and pedagogical agenda of law professors at their peak during this 
time was focused on the rest of the world. 
With all of the constitutional law-related events transpiring around the 
world, too, there was certainly plenty of grist for the scholarly mill. Within a 
few years, the three theretofore most proudly anti-constitutionalist countries in 
the world—Japan, Germany, and Italy—all adopted constitutions, and each 
adoption generated a wave of scholarly commentary.98 Law was a central part 
in the globally discussed battle over race in South Africa, which prompted 
commentaries from Yale Law Professor Grant Gilmore and Harvard Law Dean 
Erwin Griswold, among others.99 France created its most substantial 
constitution, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, in 1958, prompting an 
immediate article in the Harvard Law Review.100 
2. The Structure of Scholarship During the Rise Era 
During the Rise Era, scholarship on comparative constitutional law 
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discussed American constitutional law as well, and this scholarship featured 
articles by prominent scholars from a range of fields and areas. During the Fall 
Era, comparative constitutional law discussed a more specialized range of 
topics and featured articles by a more specialized group of scholars. 
During the Rise Era, the scholarship that addressed comparative 
constitutional law issues touched on a wide range of concerns, thereby creating 
interest in comparative constitutional law issues across a large cross-section of 
law schools and the legal profession. This comparative constitutional 
scholarship that was of use to other law professors and to the profession grew 
out of an alliance between two key scholarly factions: the more specialized 
comparative constitutional scholars who wrote about the American 
constitutional implications of their scholarship, and the more traditionally 
American constitutional scholars who integrated comparative information into 
their otherwise purely American constitutional law. 
The more specialized comparativists writing at the time—scholars like 
Karl Loewenstein and Arthur Taylor von Mehren at Harvard, and Edward 
McWhinney at Toronto—sometimes wrote articles with non-comparativists, 
and they often wrote for a non-comparativist audience. Harvard Law Professor 
and later Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Kaplan, for example, 
wrote an article about civil procedure and public norms in Germany and 
America with von Mehren.101 McWhinney wrote articles about the German 
constitutional system and its lessons for the United States.102 This meant that 
comparative constitutional law was creating scholarship of relevance to a broad 
range of those in law schools and the legal profession. 
At the same time, those professors with the greatest reputations as 
scholars of American law were writing articles that included discussions of 
comparative constitutional law developments. During the Rise Era, Harvard 
Law School Dean Erwin Griswold wrote articles with comparative 
constitutional themes,103 as did Grant Gilmore104 and Justice Douglas.105 Walter 
Gellhorn, the leading administrative law scholar of the time, wrote a series of 
articles about comparative administrative and constitutional law.106 Lon Fuller 
wrote about the emerging genre of Marxist and constitutional legal theory in 
Europe.107 Future General Counsel of the NAACP Jack Greenberg wrote about 
the constitutional law of human rights in Europe.108 Other prominent scholars 
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like William Van Alstyne and an elderly Roscoe Pound also wrote about 
comparative issues as part of their scholarship.109 
These articles also appeared in the nation’s leading law reviews, a feature 
of the Rise Era discussed earlier in Part II. The combination of the leading law 
professors of all kinds of the time writing in the nation’s leading law reviews 
was very helpful for comparative constitutional law. The Dean of Harvard Law 
School, Erwin Griswold, wrote about the area for the Harvard Law Review; one 
of the leading figures in the history of American law, Roscoe Pound, also wrote 
about it for the Harvard Law Review; a symposium on the area in The Yale Law 
Journal featured a keynote by a noted scholar and then member of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Douglas. This was good for comparative constitutional law. It 
should also be noted that political science at the time—unlike during the Fall 
Era—was very much interested in comparative constitutional law. There were 
many articles on the topic, with information and arguments that could be used 
by law professors as part of their Rise Era integrative mission.110 
3. The Larger Political Environment 
During the Rise Era, even beyond the interests of the profession, the 
interests of the country more generally focused on the rest of the world. The 
Rise Era lasted from 1945 to 1972, a period when Americans were much more 
interested in developments abroad than they would be during the Fall Era. 
These general social and political dynamics are particularly important for 
constitutional law scholarship and pedagogy in the United States, since 
constitutional law in the legal academy tends to be more related to politics in 
the United States than independent of it as in Europe.111 
At the time that law schools were focusing more and more on 
constitutional developments abroad, the country was as well. A few months 
before the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,112 the country 
was focused intensely on issues related to the rest of the world. When asked by 
Gallup what constituted the “most important problem” facing the nation—in a 
poll permitting multiple responses to this question—a full fifty-seven percent 
answered peace, seventeen percent the atom bomb, sixteen percent 
Asia/Korea/Indochina, nine percent war/Russia.113 Domestic concerns rated 
very low—things like civil rights rated very low (two percent), and though 
economic concerns rated slightly higher (sixteen percent for 
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depression/inflation/recession), they were still far below foreign concerns.114 
With occasional and brief exceptions, the country’s focus overseas remained 
constant throughout the immediate years to come.115 
The country’s international focus was part of the reason the Supreme 
Court was not as salient in law schools as it would later become. During the 
Rise Era, “the public was more focused on issues as to which the Supreme 
Court in particular and constitutional adjudication in general were largely 
spectators.”116 This was the era of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
and Red China. There was only so much time for the domestic when the 
country felt that the foreign threatened its very existence. 
Not only was the country focused more on the rest of the world, but the 
focus was of a type that encouraged interest in comparative constitutional law. 
Simply put, a form of cultural and legal imperialism is good for interest in 
comparative constitutional law, for better or for worse. Given the normative 
bias of the American law professor, when other countries have constitutional 
cultures similar to the United States, explaining the similarities is less 
interesting to law professors than pointing out differences and looking for 
normative lessons to be gleaned. And the desire to export normative differences 
rather than to import them also encourages certain types of comparative legal 
scholarship and pedagogy in order to attract the interest of those in power 
wishing to export and project American power of all sorts. 
Thus it should not be surprising that the Rise Era was an era of greater 
American exceptionalism, both inside and outside of the world of the law. 
Outside of the world of the law, the Rise Era was the period of the Marshall 
Plan and the American encouragement of economic development in Europe. It 
was the period of the Truman Doctrine and efforts to protect and encourage 
democracies around the world. It was also the period of the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars and the projection of American power into remote parts of the 
world that had interested the United States only in very minor ways before. 
This American exceptionalism found its way into the legal culture’s 
treatment of comparative constitutional law. The articles in the new American 
Journal of Comparative Law and Erwin Griswold’s Harvard Law Review 
essays on comparative constitutional law were often about exporting American 
constitutional ideas to the rest of the world. And, notwithstanding some 
Supreme Court citations to comparative constitutional law that did not privilege 
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the American constitutional experience,117 some of the more notable citations 
to comparative constitutional law (in cases like Youngstown) treated the foreign 
constitutional experience as the negative role model—the experience to 
avoid—and the American constitutional experience as the one to prioritize.118 
One way or another, though, the debates around constitutional 
imperialism featured discussions of comparative constitutional law. And this 
meant that for every Youngstown decrying the constitutional experiences of 
other countries, there was a Miranda borrowing from them. One might prefer a 
comparative constitutional law that borrows to one that distinguishes, but even 
if the constitutional culture during this time featured some anti-borrowing, 
exceptionalist ideas, the discussions and interest this triggered were part of the 
reason there were more pro-borrowing ideas. 
B. The Fall Era 
1. The Legal Profession and the Fall Era 
a. Federal Litigation and the Federal Clerkship 
When the legal profession was interested in the rest of the world during 
the Rise Era, the pedagogy and scholarship of the American law professor 
reflected this interest. Law professors came to teaching with their research 
agendas shaped by their experiences abroad. The legal profession cultivated 
this interest in the rest of the world, and law professors created a brand of 
scholarship that kept the legal profession interested in comparative 
constitutional scholarship. The story during the Fall Era is different, if more 
familiar. The attention of the profession turned toward domestic litigation, 
particularly the Warren Court. This turn meant that prominent law professors 
came from clerkships on the Warren Court, and the events of the day for law 
professors to write about related to the Warren Court. It meant that the 
profession was more supportive of scholarship related to the domestic 
constitutional issues decided by the Warren Court. 
It might appear to everyone today that the legal profession has always 
focused on constitutional litigation in the Supreme Court, but that was not 
always the case. The interests of the profession turned inward toward domestic 
courts (particularly the Supreme Court) starting around the time of the Fall Era. 
Due substantially to the Warren Court, the work of the legal profession and of 
the Supreme Court became one of the defining national issues of the day, as 
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“Richard Nixon largely ran against the Supreme Court in 1968.”119 While 
several decades ago the Supreme Court had been doing very little to gain 
attention, now the Court was a major topic during a presidential election.120 As 
Newsweek reported about the Warren Court, “For the sheer breadth and depth 
of its impact on the life of the nation, its work is unprecedented.”121 
And so it was that the profession focused its energies on the process of 
domestic litigation, particularly in federal courts, much more than in previous 
periods. As the interests of the profession changed, so did the backgrounds of 
those who became law professors. The new scholars of the previous generation 
had practiced law and served overseas in some capacity. By contrast, during the 
Fall Era, clerking for a judge (particularly a federal judge) for the first time 
became a broadly recognized status symbol for aspiring elite lawyers and 
therefore for potential law professors.122 As early as 1971, one article in the 
Harvard Law Review noted that the trend was for “[t]he background[s] of law 
professors [to be] strikingly homogeneous; almost all were law review, [and] 
many clerked for Supreme Court Justices or other notable judges . . . .”123 
Consider the significance of the change: in 1950, Michigan Law School 
hired one new tenure-track or tenured professor, and Harvard hired five.124 Of 
these six new professors (many of whom became noted legal scholars, like 
Louis Jaffe), only one had clerked.125 Between 1954 and 1955, Michigan and 
Harvard each hired three new law professors, one of whom had clerked.126 In 
1960, out of fourteen new professors among the schools, only one had 
clerked.127 In 1975, when Harvard hired three new tenure-track faculty, all 
three had clerked.128 
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The new law professors hired during the Fall Era, then, were more likely 
to have been law clerks during notable periods for notable federal judges and 
Supreme Court Justices. They were “[m]embers of a new generation who went 
to law school during the Warren Court years and entered law teaching[,] . . . a 
group that included Jesse Choper, Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, John 
Hart Ely, Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, and Laurence Tribe.”129 Each one of 
these scholars had one biographical detail in common: a clerkship for at least 
one prominent judge after graduating and before teaching. Choper130 and Ely131 
clerked for Chief Justice Warren; Ackerman for Henry Friendly and Justice 
Harlan;132 Dworkin for Learned Hand;133 Fiss for Thurgood Marshall and 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.;134 Michelman for Brennan;135 and Tribe for 
Justice Potter Stewart.136 These clerkships were the gold star that the profession 
valued and that helped members of this generation land their teaching jobs. The 
new intellectual mandarins were hired not after they had experiences in the 
world, but rather after and no doubt in substantial part because of their 
experiences in the federal courts as law clerks. 
And these clerkships had a profound impact on the careers of these future 
leaders of legal pedagogy and scholarship. Ely wrote the defining scholarly 
book of the time to justify the work of the Warren Court, in that book saying of 
Warren that “you don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”137 
Michelman wrote an entire book dedicated to articulating Justice Brennan’s 
constitutional philosophy.138 Those who had clerked for and wrote about the 
Warren Court, from either a supportive or critical perspective, authored the 
most cited scholarship of the time. This influential scholarship was about the 
Court,139 showing that constitutional law was becoming more clearly 
predominant than perhaps ever before.140 
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On the demand side, the interests of the law students who later became 
the law professors and the members of the profession—and who were the law 
review editors selecting articles to be published—changed as well. One survey 
of entering law students found that those who went to law school to work to 
pursue “civil rights or civil liberties work” quadrupled between 1960 and 
1975.141 The editors of The Yale Law Journal wrote that Earl Warren “made us 
all proud to be lawyers.”142 The editors of the Harvard Law Review dedicated 
an issue to the Warren Court, writing: “To Chief Justice Earl Warren, who with 
courage and compassion led a reform of the law while the other branches of 
government delayed, the editors respectfully dedicate this issue.”143 
With the focus then on litigation in American federal courts, the degree to 
which these courts paid attention to the teaching and scholarship of American 
law professors became a real sign of status for these academics. As Pierre 
Schlag has written, “[L]egal academics could understand themselves to be 
doing something important because they understood themselves to be important 
to the work of judges who in turn were portrayed by legal academics as very 
important.”144 Charles Reich from Yale introduced a new theory of property 
rights in his articles,145 and noted proudly that the Warren Court cited his article 
in Goldberg v. Kelly.146 Status came from recognition not just by the 
profession—as was always the case—but by the new institutions of 
significance to the profession, the American federal courts. 
b. Comparative Constitutional Law and International Law 
A large part of the fall of comparative constitutional law during the Fall 
Era also relates to the rise of international law. During the same time that 
comparative constitutional law was declining in law schools, international law 
was rising—and very much because of increased interest by the elite 
profession. This interest in international law came in part because it was 
another source of legal argument to use to support activities related to federal 
litigation. After all, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “all Treaties 
made . . . under the Authority of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
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of the Land . . . and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”147 When 
the Second Circuit decided Filártiga v. Peña-Irala148 in 1980, and the D.C. 
Circuit decided Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic149 just a few years later, 
there was more explicit, clear, and prominent judicial authorization for the idea 
that many of the central legal battles of the time could not only be litigated in 
federal court, but could be litigated using international law. Amnesty 
International and the ACLU started to bring cases raising issues related to how 
domestic federal courts might address international legal issues.150 One of the 
primary government offices entrusted with representing the government in 
these cases, the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, increased in size and 
prominence during this time and employed many young lawyers who would go 
on to become a new wave of professors of international law.151 As international 
law became a topic of interest, in substantial part because it was a topic of 
interest for federal litigation, law schools began to devote increasingly greater 
attention to that area. Around the same time Filártiga and Tel-Oren were 
decided, law schools started to create international human rights clinics.152 
These clinics proliferated in the late 1980s and early 1990s.153 The number of 
law reviews focusing substantially on international law increased from less than 
fifteen in 1972 to more than seventy thirty years later.154 Scholars started to 
write about international law in much greater amounts during the Fall Era, and 
new and important theories were introduced. These included, most notably, 
Harold Koh’s theories of transnational legal process,155 and Yale’s important 
new Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic worked on issues similar to 
Koh’s theories.156 Indeed, today it is hard to imagine a major law school not 
having at least one faculty member focusing primarily on international law in 
his or her scholarship and teaching. Nonetheless, it is fair to state that most law 
schools have no one writing and teaching about comparative constitutional 
law—or comparative law in general, for that matter. 
This rise of international law had much to do with the fall of comparative 
constitutional law. There is only so much scholarly and pedagogical oxygen to 
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go around, and much of it was being absorbed by the focus on domestic federal 
litigation. The oxygen that was going to non-American legal materials was 
increasingly going to international law. Comparative constitutional law was an 
obvious competitor to international law, particularly international human rights 
law. Both areas of law had much to say about the major legal issues of the 
day—civil liberties and public law issues. Just as international law had answers 
to questions about how far governments should protect the freedom of speech, 
so too did the domestic constitutions of other countries. But why, then, did 
international law surpass comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era? 
One reason that this attention was going to international law and not to 
comparative constitutional law was that international law was speaking to the 
elite profession in a way that comparative constitutional law simply was not, 
and the profession was interested in international law in a way that it was not 
interested in comparative constitutional law. Article VI may have established 
international law as a source of binding domestic law in the late nineteenth 
century, and the Alien Tort Claims Act may have followed suit,157 but it was 
really cases like Filártiga and Tel-Oren that opened the door to American 
lawyers and American courts spending more and more time on international 
law-related litigation in American federal courts. 
The law professors who revitalized international law during this time 
came from a profession more and more interested in international law—in 
particular as a source for American federal litigation. Thus, their backgrounds 
and their scholarship furthered this interest in international law as an area of 
interest on its own, but in particular as a source of legal argument in American 
federal courts. The new hires teaching international law had practiced for these 
human rights groups bringing international law cases in federal court or had 
worked for the Legal Adviser’s Office on these issues. Once in teaching, these 
professors’ scholarship focused on the relevance of international law to federal 
courts deciding federal cases. The leading scholarship related to international 
law deals with these issues,158 and the leading scholars are very much involved 
with federal litigation. Harold Koh of Yale Law School is now the Legal 
Adviser in the Obama administration and is sometimes mentioned as a 
candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court.159 Koh is assisted by Sarah Cleveland of 
Columbia Law School (who writes on similar issues160), and a law professor 
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and leading scholar of international law (Anne-Marie Slaughter161) can even be 
found running the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning. 
This is not just a liberal phenomenon. During the second Bush 
administration, Curtis Bradley of Duke Law School worked on these issues.162 
Jack Goldsmith, head of the Office of Legal Counsel (not technically an 
international law position), made his scholarly name in part for his writings on 
international law in domestic courts163 and coauthored a casebook on Foreign 
Relations Law with Bradley.164 After all, one of the major legal debates over 
the past decade has been about international law and its role in American 
federal courts—namely, whether the Geneva Conventions are “quaint”165 or 
still relevant in the era of the war on terror. A career in practice and scholarship 
characterized by experience in leading legal positions and citations in the 
leading legal debates of the day provide academics with enormous status in law 
teaching, and thus it is no surprise that international law scholars have focused 
on these activities and have been rewarded with influence in ways that 
comparative constitutional law scholars have not. 
It is hard for comparative constitutional law to compete with this. It is 
true that, during some periods more than others, the Supreme Court has cited to 
comparative constitutional law in major cases,166 indicating that comparative 
constitutional law could be just as relevant as international law in American 
federal litigation. This was particularly true during the Rise Era, and these 
citations declined during the Fall Era. Even given that, though, while 
international law is the “supreme Law of the Land” under Article VI of the 
Constitution, and Congress has the authority to punish “offenses against the law 
of nations,”167 there is no similar constitutional authority for discussing 
comparative constitutional law. This is not South Africa, whose Constitution 
discusses not only international law but also comparative constitutional law.168 
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Now that lawyers and judges and scholars have recognized its relevance, 
international law has surged ahead and pushed comparative constitutional law 
aside. 
It is interesting to note as well that during the Fall Era American law 
schools’ study of international law opened their eyes to diversity, as did the 
changing composition of the student body and faculties at law schools. The Fall 
Era was essentially the same period when female and minority law students 
started to enroll in American law schools in larger numbers, and then 
eventually to teach in American law schools in larger numbers. For instance, in 
1964 there were only about three hundred first-year black students in the entire 
nation, and about 100 of them were enrolled at historically black law 
schools.169 Barely one percent of law students were black.170 Nearly forty years 
later, almost eight percent of law students were black.171 In 1965-1966, women 
comprised about four percent of law students, and now they are about half.172 
This affected the composition of law faculties as well. Lani Guinier became the 
first tenured African-American female member of the faculty at Harvard Law 
School in 1998.173 
This increasing diversity domestically, however, did not coincide with an 
increasing interest in diversity as viewed through a global lens, as I have 
written about elsewhere.174 There certainly was a greater recognition of the 
ways in which law was specific to particular cultures and places, as well as the 
notion that viewing law from the perspective of different communities and 
places could make a difference. This insight was part of what led to critical race 
studies and legal feminism, but these movements largely focused on domestic 
legal issues. There was very little in the way of scholarship about how different 
countries deal with race, even among the leading lights of critical race studies. 
In the rest of the university, this increasing campus diversity led to questions 
about universality that triggered domestic doubts (postmodernism, for example) 
and comparative attention (increasing area studies requirements). By contrast, 
in law schools this increasing campus diversity led to questions about 
universality that triggered almost exclusively domestic doubts (like critical 
legal studies). 
2. The Structure of Scholarship During the Fall Era 
At the same time that the attention of the profession changed, the nature 
of the scholarship of those writing about comparative constitutional law 
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changed as well. Part of the reason that law reviews went decades between 
publishing articles about comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era—
while earlier they published several articles per issue—is the changing nature 
of the comparative constitutional scholarship being produced. Comparative 
constitutional scholarship became more specialized. Moreover, there were 
essentially no substantial articles about comparative constitutional law written 
by prominent American constitutional scholars during the entire Fall Era. 
During the Rise Era, there were many articles each year by famous 
American constitutionalists who were not really comparative constitutional 
scholars, such as Lon Fuller and Erwin Griswold. During the Fall Era, law 
reviews instead were full of discussions of litigation in American federal 
courts—of the issues presented by those cases, of the judges deciding those 
cases, and of the scholars writing about the judges deciding those cases. 
Starting in 1975, for a twenty-year period, both The Yale Law Journal and the 
Harvard Law Review had at least one issue per year featuring articles 
celebrating the career of a famous federal judge and a scholar writing about the 
famous cases decided by the Warren Court. 
During the Fall Era, the literature about comparative constitutional law 
was written by those with an exclusive interest in comparative issues, not 
American issues. These articles were published in specialized journals like the 
American Journal of Comparative Law or the literally hundreds of other 
specialized comparative and international law journals created during that 
time.175 Cognate disciplines also changed. Comparative law became more 
focused on private law,176 and political science stopped writing about law and 
constitutions and explicitly disavowed analysis of institutions and rules177—the 
precise subject that law professors study. 
In other words, at the moment the profession became keenly interested in 
developments in American law and American courts, the scholars they were 
most likely to read were writing only about American law and American 
courts, and comparativists were not writing much at all about American law 
and American courts. Examples abound. During the Rise Era, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg spent time in and coauthored a casebook about Sweden178 and wrote 
articles about the comparative constitutional treatment of gender.179 During the 
Fall Era, the ACLU tapped her to write the brief for the appellant in an 
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important domestic constitutional law case before the Supreme Court, Reed v. 
Reed.180 During the Rise Era, Erwin Griswold wrote about South African 
judicial decisions, discussed Australian legal education, and created the 
comparative law program at Harvard Law School.181 During the Fall Era, first 
as Solicitor General and later in private practice, he appeared before the Warren 
and Burger Courts arguing American constitutional law cases.182 
3. The Larger Political Environment 
Just as the attention of the country was focused overseas during the Rise 
Era, during the Fall Era the attention of the country began to shift to domestic 
issues. The Rise Era ended in 1972, the year of Richard Nixon’s reelection and 
the first mobilization for and counter-mobilization against the Great Society 
and the War on Poverty. With the American withdrawal from Vietnam, there 
was no major American military effort overseas until the first Gulf War in 
1991. Stagflation and the oil crisis of the 1970s gave way to the recession of the 
first term of the Reagan administration and the continuing domestic focus it 
caused. The “moral majority” that Nixon relied upon was focused on domestic 
affairs, and, as polls at the time showed, public concern in general centered on 
these issues.183 
Likewise, the cultural and legal imperialism of the earlier period gave 
way to a more balanced view of foreign constitutional experiences. 
Constitutional scholars were no longer writing about the failures of the foreign 
experience and the triumphs of the domestic one. The few articles in the 
American Journal of Comparative Law on comparative constitutional topics 
highlighted the similarities between the rest of the world and the American 
constitutional experience. A few articles talked about constitutional lessons for 
the United States, an endeavor less likely to succeed than the exporting model 
of comparative constitutional law practiced earlier. This was the era of 
postmodernism and cultural relativism, not cultural imperialism. 
IV. THE COSTS OF THE FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Why should the rise and fall of comparative constitutional law be of 
particular concern? For one thing, the field of scholarship that comparative 
constitutional law was part of—and later was in part replaced by—is a field of 
scholarship particularly reliant on the type of factual insights that comparative 
experience could have potentially and particularly provided. Many of the most 
significant developments in American constitutional law in the past half 
century could have been foreseen if the time had been taken to look at 
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constitutional experiences abroad. Another reason that the disappearance of 
comparative constitutional law was consequential is that it will now be difficult 
to piece the field back together. An entire infrastructure, encouraged by the 
actions of our courts, was built to support the development of domestic 
constitutional litigation. The creation of this infrastructure, to the almost 
complete neglect of an infrastructure for comparative constitutional law (or 
many parts of foreign law more generally), makes it that much harder to create 
a comparative constitutional law infrastructure now. The major scholarly 
change that happened between the Rise and the Fall Eras is, in some ways, 
irreversible. The domestic litigation infrastructure encouraged by the Warren 
Court meant that research, resources, and social movements have all been 
created to support domestic constitutional litigation—and not anything else. 
This also has had negative consequences for the core institution of American 
judicial review, which is now dependent on a narrow range of domestic law 
arguments to justify its very existence. 
A. The Costs to American Constitutional Scholarship 
1. The Methodology of American Constitutional Scholarship 
One reason why American constitutional scholarship has suffered from 
the absence of comparative constitutional scholarship is because of the kinds of 
arguments that American constitutional scholarship predominately makes: 
arguments based at least in part on assumptions about how the world actually 
operates. American constitutional scholarship is, as Robert Merton would 
describe it, “middle-range theory.”184 To be sure, there are scholars interested 
in what Sanford Levinson has called “meta-constitutional theory” as opposed to 
“constitutional theory.”185 These scholars make arguments about constitutional 
law purely on normative legal theory (based either on first principles of 
jurisprudence, or on traditional legal sources like text) rather than empirical 
reality. But this is the exception, and the almost universal rule is that American 
constitutional scholarship includes arguments about the effects of rules or 
institutional arrangements on empirical reality. 
This should not be surprising, since the decisions of the Supreme Court 
cases that dominate the attention of so many American constitutional law 
scholars themselves are exercises in middle-range theory. When the Supreme 
Court addresses the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action 
programs, for example, it considers whether such programs “are [actually] 
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”186 Regardless 
of whether courts should be referencing comparative constitutional sources, 
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there are many good reasons to think that scholarship about constitutional 
law—so much affected by these middle-range concerns—could consider 
comparative sources across all different types of issues. Since nearly ninety 
percent of the countries in the world now have some form of constitutional 
review, comparative constitutional law potentially offers enormous amounts of 
factual information, information that is particularly relevant because 
constitutional scholars make arguments based on facts. 
Not only is comparative constitutional experience methodologically 
relevant to American constitutional scholarship given its arguments, but there is 
also plenty of comparative constitutional law, in terms of relevance and sheer 
amount. Indeed, it might be a bold statement, but it is a true one: for every 
major American constitutional issue, there is some relevant comparative 
constitutional experience that either predated or postdated the American 
constitutional experience. We have tiers of scrutiny, and the rest of the world 
has proportionality.187 We have the “living constitution,”188 and Canada has the 
“living tree.”189 Abram Chayes wrote about impact litigation190 but was 
advocating an approach to justice that the Indian Supreme Court was trying at 
around the same time.191 It might be true that “we are all realists now,”192 and 
because of that it is certainly true that almost all of us should be comparative 
constitutionalists now. If any American constitutional scholar advocates an 
approach based on predictions about how the world will operate in response, it 
is essential to study all available information related to that approach. There 
will almost always be directly relevant and intellectually accessible 
comparative information that would “cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem,”193 and almost 
all constitutional scholarship makes arguments about such consequences. In 
this way, almost all American constitutional scholarship could and should be 
informed by comparative constitutional law. 
This is particularly true given how long and how much scholars have 
been discussing constitutional issues in the United States. Even apparently new 
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constitutional ideas in the United States might not be truly novel, since the 
American ideas are so thickly and deeply embedded in the history and practice 
of the United States that they only allow for narrowly original claims. From the 
Federalist Papers, to James Wilson’s Lectures on Law and Joseph Story’s 
Commentaries on the Constitution, to James Bradley Thayer’s The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,194 scholarly writing 
about American constitutional scholarship goes back several hundred years. 
This may make it difficult to come up with truly new ideas or arguments, and 
even novel ideas are often constrained by the effect of this long history and 
practice of American constitutional writing. 
It is notable, for instance, how many major pieces of constitutional 
scholarship in the past several decades have been affected by the touchstone 
American debate on originalism that emerged in the 1980s. Even scholars 
unsympathetic to originalism, like Bruce Ackerman, still write books about the 
Founding legacy in the midst of making otherwise new and provocative 
arguments.195 Ackerman’s idea of “dualist democracy” might be novel, but 
imagine how much more novel it would have been if it were less influenced by 
a constitutional culture moving in an originalist direction. 
As an example of the methodology of American constitutional 
scholarship and how comparative constitutional law is relevant—because of its 
methodology and because of the usefulness of comparative insight—consider 
the debate over the proper role for American courts in constitutional 
adjudication. Scholars have long been “preoccupied with the antidemocratic 
nature of judicial review,”196 Barry Friedman has termed this debate the 
“obsession” that dominates American constitutional scholarship.197 Some have 
written to deny that this “difficulty” even exists.198  
The leading attempts to respond to this difficulty (and the most cited 
articles in the history of American legal scholarship199) involve a focus on 
different procedural options that courts have at their disposal to mitigate the 
interference with the democratic process that their decisions might create. This 
“procedural response” literature, the work of Bickel, Guido Calabresi, Sunstein, 
and others, is meant to propose a series of techniques to minimize the impact of 
judicial decisions. But these scholars have largely missed the comparative 
experience with their suggested procedural responses and so have entirely 
missed the ways in which these responses have actually led to more judicial 
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power—in the United States and elsewhere—rather than less. 
The notion that American constitutional scholars addressing procedural 
responses to the countermajoritarian difficulty might consider comparative 
experience is not revolutionary. Indeed, the first substantial scholarly 
contribution to the debate, James Bradley Thayer’s The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,200 was itself probably the first 
important comparative constitutional law article published in an American law 
review. Thayer was, as the article’s title suggests, discussing the (distinctively) 
American doctrine of constitutional law. This was not mere rhetoric, as Thayer 
spent substantial parts of his otherwise short article discussing comparative 
constitutional law regarding judicial review. Thayer discussed the practice of 
France, Germany, Switzerland, Colombia, and the United Kingdom.201 During 
the Rise Era, there were many other articles that discussed the proper role for 
American courts by referencing comparative constitutional experience.202 
During the Fall Era, though, as the proper role for courts in constitutional 
cases became a major issue during the Warren Court and going forward, much 
of the comparative dimension of the discussion disappeared. Consider, for 
instance, the hugely important and insightful scholarship of Guido Calabresi, 
himself one of the most informed scholars about comparative legal 
developments more generally.203 Calabresi transformed the debate about the 
proper role for courts in constitutional cases, first through his Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Lectures and book204 and then through his Harvard Law Review 
Foreword.205 Calabresi argued that courts should have the power to force 
legislatures to take a “second look” at problematic laws.206 A central element of 
his argument for this second-look doctrine was the actual relationship that it 
would create between courts and the other branches of government. Calabresi 
argued that this second-look doctrine would meet resistance from the other 
branches of government but would prompt them meaningfully to reconsider 
their decisions without courts overwhelming them or interfering with them too 
much.207 
Although he was making empirical arguments, Calabresi did not consider 
the full range of empirical resources that would help him validate his 
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predictions and expectations. To his credit, Calabresi did discuss some 
comparative constitutional experiences, a rarity among the scholars during the 
Fall Era. In his Holmes Lectures and in his book, he did so just in passing, but 
in his Harvard Law Review Foreword, he discusses comparative experience in 
greater detail.208 His discussion of the comparative material, though, only 
highlights some different forms of judicial review, and does not address the 
empirical lessons related to his second-look proposal to be drawn from other 
countries. At the time, there were already several foreign constitutional 
provisions and experiences very similar to Calabresi’s second-look procedure 
that suggested that legislatures would not reconsider their laws even if judicial 
decisions used a second-look approach. The most prominent debate at the time 
was about the second-look doctrine in Canada, whose experience suggested 
that legislatures would defer to courts even when those courts invite the 
legislature to reconsider their laws.209 Going back several decades, both 
Germany and Italy also had substantial experiences with second-look doctrines 
(often called “admonitory powers”), and there legislatures still generally 
deferred to courts even when invited to reconsider.210 Even when scholars make 
comparative references, then, sometimes they might not fully consider the 
empirical lessons to be drawn from them. 
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2. Alternatives to Comparative Constitutional Scholarship 
Some of the criticisms levied against procedural response scholars for 
neglecting comparative constitutional law could also be levied against them for 
neglecting other sources of insight as well. For instance, perhaps Calabresi 
would have realized that the second-look doctrine would not create true 
dialogue and that legislatures would be very deferential to courts if he had read 
the political science research of James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira 
about “positivity bias.” This scholarship shows how people’s impressions of 
courts are more favorable the more they are exposed to them, thereby 
explaining why courts tend to overwhelm other branches of government.211 Or 
one could look at American constitutional history, as Calabresi did, for 
“antecedents and roots” to this second-look doctrine.212 There certainly are 
many American Supreme Court cases employing something like the second-
look doctrine, as an enormous (302-page) article by Dan Coenen full of 
examples demonstrates.213 The federal Declaratory Judgment Act also grants 
courts powers similar to the powers that Calabresi envisions courts having as 
part of his second-look doctrine.214 There is also experience similar to popular 
constitutionalism from American constitutional history.215 With all of this 
available information, why look at comparative constitutional law in particular? 
There is no reason to examine comparative constitutional law exclusively, 
or perhaps even primarily or to the exclusion of these other sources of research 
insight. Many of the concerns voiced in this Article about the absence of 
attention to comparative constitutional law can and have been raised, for 
equally valid reasons, about the absence of scholarly attention to history,216 
political science,217 or other sources of insight. But there are also reasons to 
believe that comparative constitutional law, if not the only source of insight, 
might be a particularly helpful one. 
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One reason why this might be the case is the type of evidence produced 
by comparative constitutional research. Particularly when it is in the form of 
integrated scholarship, comparative constitutional scholarship and experience 
may be easier for American law professors to understand than other sources of 
insight. There are cultural literacy reasons for academics to care about 
comparative constitutional scholarship, for sure, but those might not be the 
most important reasons for them to read about comparative constitutional law. 
Instead, comparative constitutional law might be relevant to scholars because it 
can generate new ideas and can also be a form of “social science on the cheap.” 
Empirical evidence of the sort mostly provided in pure social science articles 
can be difficult for law professors to understand. The same is true of the 
technical language and methodology of history scholarship. Comparative 
constitutional law scholarship, however, is still often legal scholarship of the 
more traditional sort. It involves (translated) cases and discussions of those 
cases, but in a format and language that law professors can understand.218 It can 
cast an “empirical light”219 on issues, but an empirical light without the 
confusion and complication that might come from consulting other sources of 
empirical insight. 
Another major potential alternative source of scholarly insight is 
international law. As discussed in Section III.B, international law has increased 
in prominence, and there are now many treaties, cases, and articles that might 
inform constitutional scholarship. But while this field may have some helpful 
insights for American constitutional law, there are some problems with 
considering it in the context of American constitutional scholarship and 
teaching. 
International law might have helpful answers, but the questions it asks are 
different from the questions comparative constitutional law asks. Devising rules 
to govern several countries is different from devising a rule to govern the 
domestic constitutional order of one country. A rule for international human 
rights law might be constructed at a higher level of generality, or in a weaker 
way, because it needs to be implemented by a range of countries in a range of 
places by a range of different types of courts and institutions. Looking for a 
rule to govern a single country and its inevitably more homogeneous 
institutions is different. 
In this way, domestic constitutional law has a certain similarity of 
language across different countries that international law does not share with 
domestic constitutional law. David Law can write about the “generic 
constitutional law”220 that characterizes every constitutional system, and Justice 
Breyer can discuss the “common legal problem[s]”221 that domestic 
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constitutional systems face. Constitutional law seems to have certain 
similarities across countries, which suggests that borrowing is possible and 
insights can be gleaned, since the questions are roughly similar. Tiers of 
scrutiny are another way to address a problem like the one proportionality is 
trying to address. International law has a different language and doctrinal and 
political structure because it is trying to address a different set of problems. 
In addition to the costs of other alternatives, there are also reasons to 
think that comparative constitutional law in particular has some particular 
benefits as a source of insight. As a methodological matter, since the potential 
sources of comparative insight are much greater in number (hundreds of 
countries rather than simply the history of one country, the United States, or of 
fifty states) it is much more likely that there will be a constitutional experience 
directly on point rather than simply tangentially related. If we want to know 
what happens when a country adopts a national constitutional rule requiring 
gay marriage, there is no directly on-point American experience. There is 
experience with state rules, but the only directly applicable experience is 
foreign. Then there can be scholarship translating that experience into a more 
comprehensible format for American legal scholars.222 
This is comparative constitutional law as empirically relevant—but there 
is more. After several hundred years of American constitutional experience, 
and with several hundred law schools producing several thousand scholars 
writing about constitutional law for several decades, we may simply have run 
out of truly new ideas in the American constitutional context. Where 
comparative experience is similar to ours, it can be helpful for empirical 
reasons. But where comparative experience is truly different, it might be one of 
the last sources of genuinely new ideas or empirical insights. 
Many of the concerns about comparative constitutional scholarship are 
not unique to comparative scholarship and are shared by all forms of 
scholarship that do not involve reading basic American legal texts found on 
Lexis or Westlaw. The problems involved in understanding the experiences of 
other countries are significant, but not necessarily any more formidable than 
other sources of insight based on experience. There is no reason why it is easier 
fully to understand the American constitutional situation in 1787, or the 
intricacies of the constitutional experience of Alabama in 2010, if one is not 
from either of those times or places.223 
This is particularly true now that comparative constitutional law, as will 
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be discussed in greater detail in Part V, is developing an intellectual 
infrastructure. It became much easier to discuss the Constitutional Convention 
once Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention224 was published. 
Likewise, now that Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg have compiled a 
database of the large majority of constitutional texts over history225 and reports 
analyzing that database,226 it is getting easier to talk about foreign constitutional 
experience. The difficulties of this type of research are substantial, but 
particularly now, they are no more substantial than any type of research that 
extends beyond reading American legal texts and cases. 
B. How the Warren Court and Reactions to It Affected Comparative 
Constitutional Law 
Comparative constitutional law largely disappeared from law schools, as 
Part II discussed, and this was in part because of the obsessive focus by the 
profession on the Warren Court, as Part III explained. But only now that the 
field of comparative constitutional law is enjoying something of a resurgence 
can the damage done by this Warren Court-induced disappearance become 
clearer. It is not merely the absence of comparative constitutional law 
scholarship that was damaging. Instead, this absence plus the entrenchment of 
an alternative infrastructure means that it will be very difficult for comparative 
constitutional law to revive itself. Starting from zero is hard enough, but 
because of the nature of the disappearance of comparative constitutional law, 
the field is actually starting from less than zero. Other fields have become more 
entrenched, and it is hard to undo the scholarly infrastructure they have created 
in absolute or relative terms. 
During the Fall Era, the American legal system sent those potentially 
interested in comparative constitutional law a clear message: we do not care 
about what you care about. Because of this message, an infrastructure was built 
to support domestic litigation and to support scholarship related to this 
litigation. This infrastructure was created at the expense of any infrastructure 
related to comparative and international law, and it was created by and for 
social movements that focused on domestic litigation and were largely 
oblivious to comparative constitutional issues. This infrastructure was initially 
created to support and extend the decisions of the Warren Court, but in some 
ways those in opposition have joined in to limit or roll back the decisions of the 
Warren Court. The rise of the “conservative legal movement” that Steven Teles 
describes227 was in many ways an attempt to repeal the decisions of the Warren 
Court. But even if its goal was to develop new domestic legal arguments for 
why the Warren Court was wrong (based in originalism or law and economics, 
for example), this movement was still engaging with the domestic legal 
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arguments pushed by the Warren Court and not with comparative constitutional 
law. 
The Warren Court made some references to comparative constitutional 
law, but besides those occasional references and one international law case 
(Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino228), it largely rejected nondomestic 
legal arguments. This became most obvious when a range of “American courts 
consistently . . . turned away challenges”229 to the Vietnam War based in part 
on comparative legal arguments. A range of civil rights claims were brought to 
American courts and other legal institutions as comparative legal arguments, 
but these arguments were roundly defeated or, more often, ignored.230 The 
message was clear: arguments based on non-American legal sources, 
particularly comparative legal sources, were a complete waste of time, while 
domestic legal arguments were a worthwhile focus of attention. Groups like the 
civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental 
movement structured themselves to bring domestic legal claims and nothing 
else. 
Because there is no infrastructure of ideas and action related to 
comparative constitutional law, there are no institutions or actors to reiterate a 
message about the role of comparative constitutional law in the American legal 
system. It is simply harder to convince people to accept something if they were 
socialized without even knowing of its existence.231 There is a strong normative 
power of the actual, and with no cases decided and no arguments articulated 
related to comparative constitutional law, the field has an enormous uphill 
battle to fight. 
As a result, when a decision like Lawrence v. Texas232 references 
comparative constitutional law, it is seen as somehow new and therefore 
unsettling—a cynical and revolutionary strategic ploy (in that case by 
constitutional liberals), rather than a normal and accepted part of our 
constitutional praxis. Comparative constitutional law now has to convince 
people that it is helpful and relevant because it is viewed as a new 
constitutional subject. Part of the normative power of the actual is that the 
inevitable conflict that is produced when legal institutions take jurisprudential 
arguments seriously produces certain settled understandings or basic 
agreements on first principles. As the literature about social movements 
explains, “Vying movements may view each other with enmity, but to make 
claims that satisfy the . . . public . . . movements need, however indirectly, to 
answer objections the other has raised. Answering an opponent’s objections is a 
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practice of recognition, however begrudging.”233 This is entirely lacking when 
it comes to comparative constitutional law. 
There might have been intense conflict about the Warren Court at first 
and for a while, but with time there came to be certain basic shared core 
principles that many groups could accept—perhaps equivalent to what the 
conservative Rehnquist Court, in declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, called 
“essential”234 to Roe and the constitutional treatment of abortion.235 Reva 
Siegel has argued that this is what transpired in conflicts about the 
constitutional treatment of gender, resulting in a shared understanding of 
formal equality.236 The same is true of race. The battle over race was bitter at 
the time, but because it was a battle, at a minimum, “Brown became a fixed 
point in the legal culture.”237 A Republican President, Richard Nixon, agreed 
with it,238 and John Roberts cited it as substantial positive precedent in his 
central opinion on race and the Constitution.239 
When it comes to the more purely theoretical—as opposed to practical—
implications of jurisprudential movements, the same dynamic prevails. Conflict 
can be good and clarifying for jurisprudential movements in creating consensus 
on first principles. It was helpful for law and economics to have both the 
conservative, later Reagan judicial appointee Posner, as well as the liberal, later 
Clinton judicial appointee Calabresi writing in that movement.240 Calabresi and 
Posner might have disagreed about outcomes, but “both . . . embraced the core 
of economic analysis as a mechanism for thinking about legal problems.”241 
With no litigation, intellectual, or other infrastructure built up around 
comparative constitutional law, there has been no conflict about these issues. 
Groups like the ACLU or NAACP on the left, or the Christian Coalition or 
Right to Life Coalition on the right, did not bother to argue about comparative 
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constitutional law, because courts and others told them not to bother. And with 
no conflict, we are still debating first principles about whether scholars and 
courts should even be examining what other countries are doing in the first 
place. Conservatives writing about comparative constitutional law, with few 
exceptions, write to contest its very validity rather than to engage with it, and 
liberals are still encouraging people to study comparative constitutional law in 
the first place. Everyone is still debating first principles. 
The Court’s decision in Lawrence is a good example of this dynamic. 
One of the core principles articulated in the decision—that private consensual 
sodomy is constitutionally protected—was contested within the professional 
legal culture,242 but for the most part it was not contested in the White House, 
Congress, or the general public. However, the use of comparative constitutional 
law citations was contested within the professional culture,243 leading members 
of Congress to call for the potential impeachment of Supreme Court Justices.244 
Even the minimal use of the jurisprudential practices of comparative 
constitutional law—a tangential and largely irrelevant citation of a few 
paragraphs in a Supreme Court case—was deeply controversial and contested. 
The recent intense conflict over this issue, though perhaps unfortunate on its 
own terms, is therefore perhaps encouraging because it means that there will be 
the types of conflicts in our constitutional culture that eventually move 
jurisprudential movements forward. 
A major part of the reason that the Warren Court’s interest in domestic 
litigation set comparative constitutional law further back concerns the 
relationship between the profession, social movements, and jurisprudential 
movements. There is much scholarship on the role that social movements can 
play in changing the profession and what the profession can do for social 
movements, but jurisprudential movements are also part of the equation. The 
jurisprudential movements created by the Warren Court were also in part 
created by social movements. The arguments, infrastructure, and personnel of 
the civil rights movement certainly played a substantial role in creating modern 
constitutional scholarship. Some scholars, like Mark Tushnet, write about that 
social movement;245 others, like Owen Fiss, were in the Justice Department and 
working on these issues.246 There are Women’s Studies departments and 
African-American Studies Departments and changed classes and scholarship in 
the rest of the university in substantial part because of social movements. 
But no social movement ever really cared about comparative 
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constitutional law. There are many reasons that they could have. Comparative 
constitutional law could have strategic legal uses for various sides, and its 
comparative nature might have been a natural fit for an internationally oriented 
movement like the nuclear peace movement or the immigrants’ rights 
movement. Led by a Warren Court and then a profession that focused 
everything on domestic law, however, there was no strategic reason for any 
social movement to invest in or care about comparative constitutional issues. A 
good example of this dynamic comes from the recent confirmation hearings for 
Sonia Sotomayor. When Sotomayor said potentially negative things about race 
or gender during the confirmation hearings, the groups related to those social 
movements reacted with criticism and political pressure.247 When she said 
negative things about comparative constitutional law, there were no groups to 
react.248 
Because of this entire infrastructure related to domestic law, not only has 
comparative constitutional law suffered, but so too has American judicial 
review. The singular concern of those who studied the Warren Court was to 
find a domestic legal justification for the Court’s decisions. For instance, Frank 
Michelman provided a Rawlsian justification.249 John Hart Ely provided a 
justification based on democratic theory.250 Their arguments were different, but 
their raison d’être was the same: to find a way to justify a court decision and 
the judicial authority to issue that decision based on domestic legal sources. But 
there have been and continue to be other arguments in favor of judicial review, 
particularly from comparative experience, stemming from the fact that about 
ninety percent of the countries in the world use it, many with great success. 
This has also been damaging for political movements that want to elicit 
favorable decisions from the Supreme Court and other courts, and so want to 
encourage scholars to write about issues that support these movements. The 
Warren Court handed down several decisions that supported liberal causes. 
Some liberals argued that the Court should use only domestic law in support of 
these decisions because the use of nondomestic sources risked drawing 
additional and unnecessary criticism to its already controversial holdings.251 
The result was that, once the Court was less favorable to the domestic 
legal claims being brought by liberals—as the Warren Court turned into the 
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts—liberals had to make claims that might 
have been constitutionally worthy, but were much more radical in the eyes of 
the Court than they needed to be. There were many law professors who first 
made their careers in practice related to the domestic legal infrastructure and/or 
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clerked for Warren Court Justices (Harold Koh, who worked at the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and Vicki Jackson, who clerked for 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, for example) who later turned to comparative 
constitutional issues once the more conservative Supreme Court turned against 
many of their arguments about domestic constitutional law. By that point, 
though, however compelling their work was, they were working in academia, 
and the Supreme Court had years of experience in justifying its decisions based 
exclusively on domestic law arguments. It was completely new territory for 
these scholars and for the courts they were trying to convince. 
The same could be said of the conservative legal movement and its 
relationship to judicial review. Although the conservative movement might 
now have a Supreme Court more favorable to its claims, the current climate of 
renewed interest in comparative constitutional law might lead the Court to turn 
more to the right than it would otherwise to be consistent with comparative 
constitutional law that is more conservative. There is plenty of conservative 
comparative constitutional law, as Justice Scalia, among others, has noted.252 
When the conservative legal movement faced a completely inhospitable 
Warren Court, maybe it would have helped if conservative legal scholars also 
made comparative constitutional arguments. And, if a liberal Supreme Court 
exists again, maybe it would help if conservatives prepared that liberal Court 
for the conservative comparative constitutional law it would have considered 
earlier and therefore should consider again.  
Of course, all of these concerns might be avoided if liberals and 
conservatives and domestic and comparative scholars alike create a durable 
structure for comparative constitutional law. The next Part discusses how that 
might be done. 
V. REVERSING THE FALL AND RECREATING THE RISE 
Comparative constitutional law has enjoyed something of a resurgence in 
the past ten years. The years since 1989 have featured an increasingly globally 
engaged legal profession. Just as the years after World War II featured a wave 
of constitutional creation around the world that attracted the interest of the 
American bar, so too have the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall.253 The 
profession has responded by creating groups like the Central and East European 
Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar Association,254 and law firms have 
opened offices overseas in record numbers.255 
It took nearly ten years after 1989 for these developments to affect legal 
pedagogy and scholarship, but now they certainly have. A series of Harvard 
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Law Review Forewords have discussed comparative constitutional law, 
including one written by a Supreme Court Justice of another country.256 
Prominent law reviews are publishing more articles related to comparative 
constitutional law,257 and law reviews in general are publishing comparative 
constitutional law articles in greater numbers than during the Fall Era.258 
During the recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Elena Kagan, she 
was asked about her decision as Dean of Harvard Law School to require a 
comparative or international law class but not a constitutional law class.259 
Because of efforts to “bring the state back in,”260 cognate disciplines have 
started to examine comparative constitutional politics again. 
This time, though, this interest in comparative constitutional law needs to 
be more durable. Interest in the field is of course not new, but durability would 
be. Based on some efforts that were successful during the Rise Era, and some 
of the tactics used by other successful jurisprudential efforts, this Part begins 
the project of creating a durable second Rise Era by suggesting several reforms 
to American legal education. 
A. Speaking to the Profession and to Law Schools 
First, just as Henry Manne did for law and economics, a series of 
seminars could be offered every year in comparative constitutional law for 
judges, law professors, and law review editors. Manne’s seminars reached over 
five hundred judges, from conservatives to liberals like Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(when she was on the D.C. Circuit).261 At one point, Manne’s seminars had 
been attended by forty percent of the federal judiciary.262 The judges attending 
the seminars generally considered the program to be a success, and it 
influenced their decisions, therefore making law and economics of greater 
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interest to the profession.263 Manne involved a range of law professors in these 
seminars, which interested a range of law professors who were otherwise 
uninterested in law and economics.264 These seminars also educated law review 
editors in law and economics, which made them more comfortable with articles 
about the topic.265 These programs also received a great amount of media 
attention, which led to even more awareness and therefore discussion of law 
and economics.266 
George Priest has identified several reasons why these programs were 
successful: the seminars were free, featured prominent scholars, were held in 
great locations (often Miami), and featured illuminating (and cross-ideological) 
content.267 One could imagine a similar situation for comparative constitutional 
law seminars. A group like the Ford Foundation, so crucial to the success of 
comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era, could also subsidize these 
classes during a more durable Rise Era right now. It should also be easy to hold 
classes about comparative constitutional law in appealing geographical 
locations. Just as Manne’s seminars featured liberal instructors like Paul 
Samuelson,268 along with liberal attendees like Justice Ginsburg and District 
Court Judge Jack Weinstein,269 these comparative constitutional law seminars 
could feature conservatives like Steven Calabresi.270 
In addition to seminars, other efforts could be taken to ensure that the 
profession realizes the relevance of comparative constitutional law. An 
overview of the field, provided either in the form of treatises or restatements, 
could also help interest lawyers practicing in the field, as well as scholars 
writing about the field. Originalism was substantially assisted by the creation of 
books documenting discussions about the Constitution at the time of the 
Founding. G. Edward White has written about how many jurisprudential 
movements and areas of law were assisted by the intellectual aid provided by 
the creation of the Restatements in the early part of the twentieth century,271 
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and the same could be true of comparative constitutional law. 
An amicus group briefing the Supreme Court on what comparative 
constitutional law says about the issues before the Court could draw attention to 
the field and encourage the Court to reference these materials—which in turn 
would cause the profession to care about these issues and scholars to write 
about them. Right now, briefs referencing comparative constitutional law are 
presented to the Court, but only rarely, and generally only to support liberal 
positions on constitutional issues.272 There is certainly plenty of comparative 
constitutional law that would favor conservatives, and therefore no reason for 
lawyers trying to win particular cases for conservative causes to fear this 
discussion of comparative constitutional law.273 
As part of interesting the profession in comparative constitutional law, it 
would also be helpful to attract the interest of advocacy groups. Part of the 
reason that the Warren Court dominated American constitutional law is that it 
created social movements with a strategic interest in the rhetoric and outcome 
of its cases. There is no comparative constitutional law social movement. It 
might be true that the infrastructure related to the international human rights 
movement (including groups like Amnesty International, referenced earlier) 
could at some point decide to use comparative constitutional arguments, but for 
some time now their attention has been almost entirely directed elsewhere. 
Activists on both sides have an interest in pushing comparative 
constitutional law. Liberals will like how much more progressive comparative 
constitutional law is than American constitutional law on many race and gender 
issues, like affirmative action.274 Conservatives will like how much more 
restrictive comparative constitutional law is when it comes to abortion rights.275 
Various groups—from liberals to conservatives to those who care about foreign 
policy to immigrants’ rights groups—might find in comparative constitutional 
law shared outcome-based and process-based grievances.276 
B. Constructing Law Schools 
Law schools, supported by the profession, need to provide the resources 
to train those potentially interested in comparative constitutional law. 
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Specialized fellowships have proven crucial to jurisprudential movements and 
to cultivating the personnel to support them. Specialized fellowships create a 
deep bench of potential scholars who can teach at schools of all kinds and all 
rankings. The Burger, Hurst, and Warren Fellowships were crucial to the 
development of professors to teach and write about legal history.277 The Olin 
Fellowships were similarly important for law and economics.278 During the 
Rise Era, the Story Fellowships at Harvard Law School were crucial to the 
development of comparative constitutional law.279 Critical legal studies, a much 
less successful jurisprudential movement, by contrast, never had a substantial 
future law professor fellowship. 
With the creation of the type of intellectual infrastructure mentioned 
earlier, there would be more resources available for those interested in writing 
about comparative constitutional law. But beyond just this, there needs to be a 
substantial return to the integrated method, both in the teaching of law school 
classes and the writing of constitutional scholarship. In the classroom, 
constitutional law classes can feature discussions of comparative constitutional 
issues as part of introductory or basic constitutional law courses. Some, most 
notably Roscoe Pound, have raised the general idea of “the pervasive method” 
for comparative law,280 which was used widely during the Rise Era. 
Importantly, this method would involve teaching the domestic, American 
constitutional issue, and then using the comparative constitutional approach as 
a policy alternative.281 
This approach has worked well before, in the Rise Era, and it can work 
well again.282 If students learned comparative constitutional law in this way, 
they would not be resistant to its relevance. They would embrace it, because 
they would be likely to see it as a normal part of learning domestic 
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constitutional law, which they have no concerns about doing and see 
themselves as potentially practicing and needing to know about after they 
graduate. If comparative materials were placed in our regular domestic law 
casebooks, then students might take comparative constitutional law more 
seriously—as something that American law students studying to be American 
lawyers might have to know, and as something they cannot avoid anyway 
because it is in the casebook they have been assigned (meaning there is no extra 
expense involved in purchasing an additional book, and no degrading of the 
comparative material because it is in a separate book).283 Faculty might 
embrace teaching comparative constitutional law through the pervasive 
method,284 since they are generally not interested in comparative constitutional 
law per se but may be interested in its relationship to the domestic 
constitutional law issues they teach and write about more usually.285 
Law professors do not need as much expertise to teach the comparative as 
it relates to the American rather than the comparative on its own. Faculty might 
not know much about the history and political context of Marbury, but are 
comfortable teaching it as part of a few class sessions. The same might be true 
of comparative constitutional law. And again, comparative constitutional law 
still involves teaching cases and drawing on traditional legal materials. It does 
not ask professors to teach statistics, negotiations, or some other entirely 
different sort of pedagogical material than is normally part of the constitutional 
law class. With the pervasive method in place, current law students, and 
therefore future lawyers and law professors, would be more interested in 
comparative constitutional law. 
Teaching comparative constitutional law through the pervasive method 
would also remedy some of the problems that have prevented other attempts at 
promoting comparative constitutional law from succeeding. There have been 
two new comparative constitutional law casebooks in the past ten years or 
so,286 as well as several readers discussing comparative constitutional issues.287 
But requiring students to purchase an entirely new book—and asking faculty to 
assign that book—simply for the sake of teaching comparative materials will 
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not be popular or successful. This is part of the reason that the pervasive 
method of teaching legal ethics failed: there were not enough students or 
faculty willing to purchase a separate book that talked about legal ethics and 
how those issues arise in each area of law.288 
Just as the pervasive method would create a legal pedagogy to improve 
comparative constitutional law, so too would integrated scholarship create a 
scholarship to help comparative constitutional law. There might be concern 
about whether integrated scholarship—particularly when it comes to something 
potentially intellectually challenging like comparative constitutional law—
might promote a certain amount of superficiality in scholarship and the 
unfortunate phenomenon that Mark Tushnet has called the “lawyer as 
astrophysicist,”289 according to which someone with a law degree can learn 
enough about any topic that they care to study. This same concern arose when 
law and economics started to produce integrated scholarship.290 In the study of 
other countries, there has been a similar debate between those who do area 
studies—deep studies of particular countries—and those who do large-N 
studies—studies of more countries with less depth for each country. 
But integrated scholarship need not be superficial scholarship. Just as 
jurisprudential movements like law and economics turned to the more detailed 
studies of cognate disciplines like economics for support for their claims, so too 
could integrated comparative constitutional law scholars turn to more detailed 
cognate scholarship to support substantially American conclusions. (Indeed, 
they already have.)291 Comparative constitutional law is a field that is big 
enough for those coming from the American constitutional scholarly tradition, 
like Bruce Ackerman, Vicki Jackson, or Mark Tushnet, as well as from the 
more comparative tradition, like Tom Ginsburg or Alec Stone Sweet. 
At a more fundamental level, jurisprudential movements like law and 
economics and comparative constitutional law face choices. These choices are 
not always dichotomous, but they do involve setting priorities. A 
jurisprudential movement can choose to be methodologically pure and 
therefore speak only to the abilities and concerns of those writing in the narrow 
field. Or it can decide to accept that at least some of its scholars some of the 
time will have to sacrifice methodological purity and topic selection to make 
research of interest to a larger community.292 For jurisprudential movements, 
the wider community is the all-important rest of the law school and the 
profession, which can make or break a movement. Sometimes a jurisprudential 
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movement has to prioritize being relevant almost as much as it has to prioritize 
being right. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At a time when members of Congress threaten to impeach Supreme Court 
Justices for citing the constitutional law of other countries,293 it is hard to 
remember back to a period when there was widespread interest in the 
constitutions of other countries. Comparative constitutional law is now seen as 
polarizing—an issue to campaign for or against—rather than as a staple of the 
intellectual and pedagogical diet of law schools. But there was an earlier period 
where interest in the field was both common and assumed, rather than rare and 
contentious. 
That period has passed, though, and the disappearance of a jurisprudential 
movement is not rare. Movements come and go, because the interests and 
activities of the legal profession come and go. What is most consequential 
about the disappearance of comparative constitutional law, though, is what the 
scholars who studied similar questions have produced in its absence: 
scholarship with brave, bold, and original new ideas, but ideas that we could 
have better understood in light of the experiences of the rest of the world. 
As law schools continue to respond to these increasingly dynamic times 
in the law and in the university, the challenge is to ensure that such an 
important jurisprudential movement does not entirely disappear yet again. The 
structures of American legal education that helped law schools be cosmopolitan 
during the Rise Era and helped jurisprudential entrepreneurs like Richard 
Posner create law and economics must be applied to create a durable and 
permanent interest in comparative constitutional law. As the late Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist wrote when dozens of countries were creating constitutions 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, “now that constitutional law is solidly 
grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin 
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